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This article discusses three current trends in administrative law: delay
reduction, increased public participation, and increased agency accounta-
bility. These trends are first discussed individually, isolated from the
others; then the interaction between these divergent trends is explored. The
author's conclusion is that delay reduction will often conflict with ex-
panded participation and increased accountability. He suggests that con-
flicts among these trends can best be understood and dealt with by a
system of goal analysis. Five general goals which administrative agencies
should strive to effectuate are established. Some of these goals are then
identified to the three different trends. This allows conflicts among the
three trends to be analyzed from the perspective of conflicts in these basic
goals. Professor Ogden suggests several integrating principles which can
be applied to resolve the conflicts. Chief among these are requirements
that agencies prioritize their goals and, to the extent such prioritizing
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doesn't resolve the conflict, require agencies to make tradeoffs among con-
flicting goals. Finally amendments to the APA and legislative standards
are suggested to implement this approach.
I. INTRODUCTION 1
Delay in administrative decisionmaking 2 is an intractable prob-
lem. 3 The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in a re-
cent, major study stated that "[mjost federal regulatory
proceedings are characterized by seemingly interminable de-
lays."4 Agency delay adds additional costs and imposes addi-
tional burdens on the industries regulated and on the consuming
and tax-paying public.5 Were delayed decisionmaking the only
problem facing American administrative agencies in the 1970's,
the solution would be much simpler. However, that is not the
case.6 Dissatisfaction with administrative agencies is strong
enough to have triggered two other powerful trends: expanded
public access to, and public participation in, administrative
agency proceedings, and a demand for increased accountability of
the agencies to the Legislature and the public.7
1. This article is the final part of a study by the author on the problem of
administrative delay. Other aspects of this subject are discussed in Ogden,
Judicial Control of Administrative Delay, 3 U. DAY. L. REV. 345 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Judicial Control] and Ogden, Reducing Administrative Delay: Timeliness
Standards, Judicial Review of Agency Procedures, Procedural Reform, and
Legislative Oversight, 4 U. DAY. L. REV. 71, (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Administrative Delay].
2. The Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter cited as APA] defines
agency action. Administrative Procedure Act § 2, 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1966). It
states "'agency action' includes the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license,
sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act; ...... For
purposes of this article, decisionmaking will be used in this sense.
3. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., IV STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, DELAY IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS
(Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as IV RIBICOFF REPORT].
4. IV RIBICOFF REPORT supra note 3, at v.
5. IV RIBICOFF REPORT supra note 3, at 8-10.
6. See SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 49-72 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
SCHWARTZ] in which the author highlights current efforts to reform the adminis-
trative process; e.g., sunset laws, in particular the Colorado sunset statute, id. at
59-63, enacted in 1976 and cited as COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-104 (1976).
7. For a discussion of the public access and public participation trend see
Bonfield, Representation for the Poor in Federal Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REV. 511
(1969); Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in
the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525 (1972); Gellhorn, Public Participation
in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972); Leighton, The Consumer
Advocacy Agency Proposal ... Again, 27 AD. L. REV. 149 (1975); Lenny, The Case
for Funding Citizen Participation in the Administrative Process, 28 AD. L. REV. 483
(1976); Murphy & Hoffman, Current Modelsfor Improving Public Representation in
the Administrative Process, 28 AD. L. REV. 391 (1976); Williams, Public Participa-
tion in Locating Facilities Dedicated to Public Use, PUB. UTIL FORT., Sept. 16, 1971,
at 101; Comment, Public Participation in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 120
U. PA. L. REV. 702 (1972); and Note, Federal Agency Assistance to Impecunious In-
tervenors, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1975). See also, STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON
[Vol. 7: 553, 1980] Trends in Administrative Law
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This article discusses the interrelationship between current ef-
forts to reduce administrative delay,8 to expand public participa-
tion, and to increase agency accountability to the legislature and
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, 94th CONG., 2d SESS., FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM
469-72 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as the Moss REPORT].
STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, III STUDY ON FEDERAL
REGULATION, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN REGULATORY AGENCY PROCEEDINGS, S. RES.
71, 95th CONG., Ist SESS. at vii-xiv (1977), [hereinafter cited as III RIBICOFF RE-
PORT]; Houseman, Recent Developments on Legislative Proposals to Improve Ac-
cess to Federal Courts and Administrative Agencies, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 25
(1977); Trister, Legislative Proposals to Improve Access to Federal Courts and Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1023, 1036-40 (1977).
The trend has developed sufficiently for current administrative law casebooks to
discuss the subject of public participation. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 391-404,
discussing, inter alia, the case of United Church of Christ v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, AND P.
STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3, at 634-59 (7th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
GELLHORN, BYSE AND STRAUSS]; R. STEWART AND S. BREYER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND REGULATORY POLICY 1013-58 (1979); and G. ROBINSON AND E. GELLHORN, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 808-24 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ROBINSON AND GELL-
HORN]. See also DAVIS, Public Participation and Ways of Encouraging It, in AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.33, at 601-03 (2d ed. 1978). On accountability see
SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 23.
8. On the subject of administrative delay, see Prettyman, Reducing the Delay
in Administrative Hearings, 39 A.B.A.J. 966 (1953); Davis, Administrative Law of
the Seventies § 8.08 (1976). See also Cramton, Causes and Cures of Administrative
Delay, 58 A.B.A.J. 937 (1972); Freedman, The Uses and Limits of Remand in Ad-
ministrative Law: Staleness of the Record, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 145 (1966); Kaufman,
Have Administrative Agencies Kept Pace with Modern Court-Developed Tech-
niques Against Delay? - A Judge's View, 12 AD. L. BULL. 103 (1959-60); Gellhorn,
Administrative Procedure Reform: Hardy Perennial, 48 A.B.A.J. 243 (1962);
Goldman, Administrative Delay and Judicial Relief, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1423 (1968);
Long, Administrative Proceedings. Their Time and Cost Can Be Cut Down, 49
A.B.A.J. 833 (1963); Rothman, Four Ways to Reduce Administrative Delay, 28
TENN. L. REV. 332 (1961); Note, Judicial Acceleration of the Administrative Process:
The Right to Relief From Unduly Protracted Proceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 574 (1963);
Comment, Judicial Control of Administrative Inaction: Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelhaus, 57 VA. L. REV. 676 (1971). See also Tomlinson, Report on
the Experience of Various Agencies with Statutory Time Limits Applicable to Li-
censing or Clearance Functions and Rulemaking, prepared for the ACUS. This re-
port represents only the views of the author, not necessarily those of the
Conference. Recommendation 78-3: Time Limits on Agency Action, The Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States, 1 C.F.R. § 305.78-3 (1979); G. ROBINSON AND
E. GELLHORN, supra note 7, at 830-36; GELLHORN AND BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
CASES AND COMMENTS 29-31 (6th ed, 1974); Marzloff, Delay in Review ofInitial De-
cisions: The Case for Giving More Finality to the Findings of Fact of the Adminis-
trative Law Judge, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 393 (1978); Morgan, Toward a Revised
Strategy for Ratemaking, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 21 (1978); Note, Administrative Law -
Right to Administrative Hearing; Within Ninety Days of Request by Social Secur-
ity Disability Benefit Claimant, 82 DICK. L. REV. 810 (1978); Note, Administrative
Delay in Providing Hearings for Social Security Disability, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 565
(1978).
the public.9 First, the three trends, delay reduction, participation
expansion, and increased accountability, will be described sepa-
rately. Then the interaction between the trends will be explored.
Three positions on delay and public participation will be ex-
amined. Included are the positions that delay reduction impedes
participation expansion, that delay reduction enhances participa-
tion expansion, and that delay reduction does not significantly af-
fect participation expansion. A similar examination of the
interaction of delay reduction and increased accountability, will
be undertaken. Thereafter, the goals served and standards uti-
lized to implement these trends will be compared and contrasted.
The thesis of this article is that achievement of delay reduction
may be compromised by achievement of expanded participation
and increased accountability. Similarly, achievement of participa-
tion and accountability goals can be neutralized because of delay
reduction efforts. This article will conclude with discussion of
possible solutions, including tradeoffs among disparate goals and
standards, integrating principles at the agency level and on judi-
cial review, and methods of structuring citizen and legislative i n -
tervention in the administrative process.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM TRENDS
A. Reducing Administrative Delay
The first trend in administrative reform efforts to be examined
is one which stems from a widespread dissatisfaction with the in-
tractable problem of administrative delay.'0 Typical responses to
this problem have included judicial enforcement of timeliness
standards" and advocacy of adequate budgetary and personnel
resource allocations to agencies. 12 Additionally, several authori-
9. Professor Schwartz explores the interrelationship between the processes
of expanding public participation and reducing administrative delay in SCHWARTZ,
supra note 6, at 391-404. The interrelationship of delay reduction and accountabil-
ity of agencies to Congress is indicated in IV RIBicoFF REPORT, supra note 3, at
182.
10. The scope of the problem is discussed in Administrative Delay supra note
1, at 77-78.
11. For a discussion of jurisdiction, substantive standards and remedies see
Judicial Control, supra note 1, at 348-53, 357-85; for a discussion of timeliness stan-
dards, procedural review, reform, and legislative oversight see Administrative De-
lay, supra note 1, at 73-136.
12. See W. GELLHORN AND C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COM-
MENTS 29-31 (6th ed. 1974), commenting on NLRB v. Maestro Plastics Corp., 354
F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965). Professor Gellhorn has reiterated these comments in a let-
ter to the author dated November 21, 1978. It states:
[S]ometimes delay is simply a factor of inadequate staffing. I recall hav-
ing recorded the fact, some years ago, that at a moment when the National
Labor Relations Board was being particularly criticized for its lethargy in
pursuing charges of unfair labor practices, the appropriations for the
[Vol. 7: 553, 19801 Trends in Administrative Law
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ties have made more specific reform recommendations.' 3 For ex-
ample, in the Ribicoff report eleven specific recommendations14
aimed at reducing administrative delay are made. Similarly, The
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) formu-
lated a response to the delay problem.' 5 After acknowledging the
tenacity of the problem,16 the Conference adopted several specific
recommendations. For example, it was suggested that "reason-
able timetables or deadlines can help reduce administrative de-
lay. Generally it is preferable that such limits be established by
the agencies themselves, rather than by statute."' 7
In this regard, Congress has drafted statutes with relatively
rigid timeliness standards contained in them. Of particular note
are the Speedy Trial Act,18 the Freedom of Information Act,19 the
agency and, therefore, the personnel resources available to it were being
most severely limited.
13. See Administrative Delay, supra note 1, at 114-29.
14. IV RIICoFF REPORT, supra note 3, at xiii-xv. It states generally that these
eleven proposals are: (1) use informal rulemaking more frequently; (2) speed up
decisions in such cases as "rate regulations" and "technical decisions," through
substitution by APA amendment of a "modified procedure" for "formal adjudica-
tory procedures;" (3) amend the APA to allow restriction of oral proceedings in
adjudicatory hearings; (4) strengthen the penalties available to ensure compliance
by parties with agency information requests; (5) devise procedures that speed up
the agency review process; (6) alter the process of recruiting Administrative Law
Judges to get the best people available; (7) amend the APA to require agency de-
velopment of deadlines for the completion of decisionmaking processes; (8) en-
hance the quality of "agency leadership and management;" (9) require agencies to
develop "generic standards" and to state their "goals and priorities;" (10) establish
a separate agency planning unit; and (11) strengthen legislative oversight of
agency "goals and priorities." Administrative Delay, supra note 1, at 114-29.
15. Time Limits on Agency Actions, The Administrative Conference of the
United States, 1 C.F.R. § 305.78-3 (1979).
16. Id. It stated:
Eliminating undue delay in administrative procedures has long been a
public concern .... Frustration over the inability of agencies and courts
to speed the course of administrative proceedings has occasionally led
Congress to adopt a somewhat mechanistic approach to the problem....
Congressional expectations that statutory time limits would be effective
have remained largely unfulfilled....
17. Id. The conference's recommendations as to time limits are divided into
seven categories.
18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 161-3174 (1976). The Speedy Trial Act applies to this discus-
sion by analogy only because it governs criminal litigation. Section 3161 (b) states
in relevant part: "Any information or indictment charging an individual with the
commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which
such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such
charges .... (emphasis added). Administrative Delay, supra note 1, at 76-77.
19. The FOIA requires an agency covered by the act to "determine within ten
days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) after the receipt of
Federal Privacy Act,20 and the Federal Open Meetings Act (also
known as the Government in the Sunshine Act),21 all of which
have specific timeliness standards whose purpose is primarily to
reduce delay through stringent efficiency standards. Unfortu-
nately, however, the effectiveness of many of these statutes may
be impaired significantly by "escape clauses." 22
Another approach to delay reduction has been to divide the so-
lutions along functional lines by decisionmaking activity such as
licensing. Professor Morgan utilized this approach in a recent ar-
ticle 23 wherein he discussed the causes of ratemaking delay 24 and
any such request whether to comply with such request and shall immediately no-
tify the person making such request of such determination and the reasons there-
fore. . . ." (emphasis added). Freedom of Information Act § 1, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(6) (A) (i) (1976). The Act also provides, similarly, that an agency covered by
the Act must "make a determination with respect to any appeal within twenty
days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) after the receipt
of such appeal .. " (emphasis added). 5 U.S.C. § 552(6) (A) (ii) (1976).
20. Similar provisions are contained in the Federal Privacy Act. It states:
Agencies covered by the act must permit the individual who disagrees
with the refusal of the agency to amend his record to request a review of
such refusal and not later than 30 days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays,
and legal public holidays) from the date on which the individual requests
such review, complete such review and make a final determination unless,
for good cause shown, the head of the agency extends such 30 day pe-
riod.... (emphasis added).
Federal Privacy Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. 552a(d) (3) (1974).
21. The Government in the Sunshine Act provides, in part, that "[elach
agency subject to the requirements of this section shall, within 180 days after the
date of enactment of this section [enacted September 13, 1976] . . . promulgate
regulations to implement the requirement of subsections (b) through (f) of this
section .. " Government in the Sunshine Act § 3a, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(g) (1976). For
a discussion of the Act, see Note, The Government in the Sunshine Act - an Over-
view, 1977 DUKE L.J. 565 (1977).
22. See Administrative Delay, supra note 1, at 76-77.
23. Morgan, Toward a Revised Strategy for Ratemaking, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 21
(1978). Examining the ratemaking decision process at the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) he states:
This article concerns itself with delay in a particular context-that of
ratemaking by federal agencies. Ratemaking delay is neither more signifi-
cant, more pervasive, nor even more troublesome than delay in other ar-
eas of administrative activity. However, while the causes and
consequences of delay may be similar across many kinds of administra-
tive proceedings, procedures are sufficiently different and consequences
sufficiently specialized that separate examination of ratemaking has
proved useful.
Id. at 23.
24. Ratemaking refers to agency setting of prices for regulated carriers. See
SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 317. Morgan states four causes of ratemaking delay: 1)
"Complexity of substantive issues;" 2) "agency preoccupation with other matters"
or problems with priorities; 3) parties who benefit by delay don't discourage un-
timely decisionmaking; and 4) "conscious use of delay as a regulatory tool" to cre-
ate an "incentive for efficiency." Id. at 24-26.
[Vol. 7: 553, 1980] Trends in Administrative Law
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advocated solutions for those problems. 25 His study was the basis
for a recommendation to the ACUS.26 Similarly, Professor
Verkuil advocates a unified administrative procedure in which the
use of procedural incidents such as cross-examination will vary
according to the type of decisionmaking activity involved.27
In brief summary, therefore, it can be seen that delay reduction
is a well established current trend. This fact is evidenced by the
existence of specific recommendations made by various authori-
ties aimed at that end.
B. Expanding Public Access to, and Citizen Participation in
Administrative Agency Proceedings
The next trend to be discussed is that of expanding public ac-
cess to, and citizen participation in, administrative agency pro-
ceedings. This trend is the result of dissatisfaction with
administrative agencies, particularly federal regulatory agencies.
This section will first look at several illustrative examples of this
dissatisfaction. It will then examine the trend resulting there-
from, focusing on efforts in the following areas: 1) expanding pub-
lic access to governmental information and to governmental
agency meetings; 2) enhancing citizen participation in agency
decisionmaking; and 3) easing "standing" requirements and other
obstacles to judicial review. It should be noted that some of the
developments here are also cognizable as attempts to increase
agency accountability to the legislature and the public. Those de-
velopments will be discussed, hopefully with a minimum of over-
lap, in the following section.
25. Morgan articulates three solutions for ratemaking delay; 1) "increased use
of informal relemaking;" 2) "periodic submission of relevant data;" 3) increas-
ing use of settlement as a means of deciding rate cases. Id. at 22, 55-76.
26. Reduction of Delay in Ratemaking Cases, The Administrative Conference
of the United States, 1 C.F.R. § 305.78-1 (1979). The ACUS adopted his recommen-
dation and noted that "(b) Delay in the ratemaking process occurs chiefly at two
points: (1) Developing the underlying data, a task shared by the proposer of rates,
the agency staff, and other participants in the proceedings, and (2) writing and is-
suing opinions to support the agency's decision when finally made." Id.
27. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLuM. L.
REV. 258 (1978). Professor Verkuil identifies six types of decisionmaking activities:
1) imposition of sanctions; 2) ratemaking, licensing and other regulatory decisions;
3) environmental and safety decisions; 4) awards of benefits, loans, grants, and
subsidies; 5) inspections, audits, and approvals; and 6) planning and policymaking.
Id. at 294-303.
1. Dissatisfaction with Administrative Agencies
The third Ribicoff report notes, with a degree of clarity, some
reasons for dissatisfaction with administrative agencies, and
states that public participation in agency proceedings could im-
prove the quality of agency decisionmaking.28 The report empha-
sized that regulatory agencies are often "captured" by the
industries that they represent. Additionally, it is pointed out, the
agencies frequently tend to reflect the interests of these regulated
industries, rather than those of the public.29
The report goes on to explicitly suggest that expanded public
participation would be an effective medicine for the many ills of
the administrative process. The report notes a need for more bal-
anced representation so that members of the public can counter-
balance the well financed industry lobbyists, who frequently are
the only interests represented before the agencies. 30 The Ribicoff
report concludes that greater public participation would improve
the quality of administrative agency decisions, and would en-
hance regulation in the public interest.31
Similarly, other writers, reflecting dissatisfaction with the lack
of representation of consumer interests, 32 have suggested a vari-
ety of solutions. 33 Dean Freedman, taking a deeper look at the
problem, suggests that the administrative process is in a state of
recurring and enduring crisis which, "is animated by a strong and
persisting challenge to the basic legitimacy of the administrative
process itself."34
28. III RIBICOFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 1-2. The lack of public participation
is criticized in Halpern & Cunningham, Reflection on the New Public Interest Law:
Theory and Practice at the Center for Law and Social Policy, 59 GEo. L.J. 1095
(1971); Johnson, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEO. L.J. 869 (1971);
Lazarus and Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REV. 1069 (1971); and
Nall, The Economics and Politics of Regulation, 57 VA. L. REV. 1016 (1971).
29. III RIHiCOFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 1-2.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id. at vii. It states:
(1) Full public participation in regulatory process is essential if regula-
tory agencies are to effectively discharge their mandate to regulate in the
public interest.
(2) Increased public participation and input can provide regulators
with a greater range of ideas and information, broaden the active constitu-
ency of the agency, and place greater emphasis on public interest con-
cerns and viewpoints. A lack of such public participation, on the other
hand, requires regulators to rely too heavily on input from the industry
they are charged with regulating.
32. See RALPH NADER'S CENTER FOR STUDY OF RESPONSIVE LAw, (J. Michael
and R. Fort ed. 1974); a 950 page book designed, according to Ralph Nader's intro-
ductory statements, to aid citizen access to federal administrative agencies.
33. Id. at 4-9.
34. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 6-10 (1978). Dean Freedman suggests four sources of le-
gitimacy that would, if perceived by the public as resulting from the administra-
[Vol. 7: 553, 19801 Trends in Administrative Law
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2. Expanding Public Access to Governmental Information and
to Governmental Agency Meetings
Since "expanded public access" appears to be a popular and
outwardly attractive response to the question of how to increase
the effectiveness of administrative agencies, it would seem worth-
while to examine this response in some detail.3 5
Three federal statutes-the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA),36 the Privacy Act,3 7 and the Government in the Sunshine
Act38 -embody the trend3 9 toward expanded public access to gov-
tive process, reduce public dissatisfaction with administrative agencies. These
four sources are: 1) "an indispensable position in the constitutional scheme of
government;" 2) "political accountability;" 3) "effective performance;" and 4) "fair
procedure." Freedman points out that public perception of these four sources
would ensure the legitimacy of administrative agencies. Id. at 11.
35. See, e.g., The Regulators, Federal Commission, Draw Increasing Fire,
Called Inept and Costly, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1974 at 1, col. 1.
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1979). The case law and literature on the FOIA are vast and
beyond the scope of this article. Some of the articles recently published are:
Campbell, Reverse Freedom of Information Act Litigation: The Need for Congres-
sional Action, 67 GEO. L.J. 103 (1978); Cox, A Walk Through Section 552 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act: The Freedom of Information Act the Privacy Act, and
The Government in the Sunshine Act, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 969 (1978); Singleton and
Hunter, Statutory and Judicial Responses to the Problem of Access to Government
Information, 1978 D.C.L. REV. 51 (1978); Note, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information Act-1977, 1978 DUKE L.J. 301 (1978) (9th Annual Administrative Law
Issue 1978).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1979). See also Belair, Agency Implementation of the Pri-
vacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act. Impact of the Government's Collec-
tion, Maintenance, and Dissemination of Personally Identifiable Information, 10 J.
MAR. J. 465 (1977); Gotherman, Ohio Privacy Act, 7 CAP. U.L. REV. 177 (1977);
Recchie and Wayland, Ohio's Privacy Act: An Analysis, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 159
(1979); Cox, A Walk Through Section 552 of the Administrative Procedural Act. The
Freedom of Information Act, The Privacy Act; and the Government in the Sunshine
Act, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 969 (1978); Ward, The Public's Access to Government-Free-
dom of Information, Privacy and Sunshine Acts: An Address, 70 L. LiB. J. 509
(1977).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1979). Legal periodicals discussing state and federal "Sun-
shine or Opening Meeting Acts" include: Cox, A Walk Through Section 552 of the
Administrative Procedure Act: The Freedom of Information Ac4 The Privacy Act
and The Government in the Sunshine Act, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 969 (1978); Marbles-
tone, The Relationship Between the Government in the Sunshine Act and the Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act, 36 FED. B.J. 65 (1977); Markham, Sunshine on the
Administrative Process: Wherein Lies The Shade, 28 AD. L. REV. 463 (1976);
Recchie, Government in the Sunshine: Open Meeting Legislation in Ohio, 37 OHIO
S.L.J. 497 (1976); Sussman, Illinois Open Meetings Act: A Reappraisal, 1978 So.
ILL. U.L.J. 193 (1978); Administrative Law-Government in the Sunshine Act, 1978
ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 305 (1978); Comment, Where's the Sunshine? Inadequacy of
Pennsylvania's Open Meeting Law, 82 DICK. L. REV. 719 (1978); Note, The Govern-
ment in the Sunshine Act-An Overview, 1977 DUKE L.J. 565 (1977); Comment, Gov-
ernment in the Sunshine Act: A Danger of Overexposure, 14 HAv. J. LEGIs. 620
ernment information and to governmental agency meetings. All
of these are codified in Section 552 of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.40 Moreover, a number of states have enacted Sunshine
or open meeting laws.41 Acts such as these attempt, respectively,
to expand the public availability of governmental information,42 to
(1977); Comment, The Federal "Government in the Sunshine Act' A Public Access
Compromise, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 881 (1977).
39. Several articles treat these statutes as a trilogy. See, e.g., Cox, A Walk
Through Section 552 of the Administrative Procedure Act: The Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, The Privacy Act, and The Government in the Sunshine Act, 46 U. CIN. L.
REV. 969 (1978); Ward, The Public's Access to Government - Freedom of Informa-
tion, Privacy, and Sunshine Acts. An Address, 70 L. LIB. J. 509 (1977).
40. The three statutes are internally integrated. For example, the FOIA ex-
emptions contained in 552(b) are, with three exceptions, the same exemptions as
are contained in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c) (1979). The identical exemp-
tions are: 1) national defense, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(1) and c(1); 2) internal personnel, 5
U.S.C. § 552b(2) and c(2); 3) exempted from disclosure by statute, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552b(3) and c(3); 4) trade secrets, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(4) and c(4); 5) personal infor-
mation if invades personal privacy, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(6) and c(6); 6) law enforcement
records, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(7) and c(7); and 7) financial institution regulatory reports,
5 U.S.C. § 552b(8) and c(8).
Similarly, the Privacy Act is coordinated with the FOIA in that 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(b) (1979) conditions of disclosure, contains a specific exemption allowing
nonconsensual disclosure when, (b) (2), "required under section 552 of this title,"
one of eleven exemptions. Absent one of the exemptions, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)
(1974) conditions of disclosure, requires consent. It states: "No agency shall dis-
close any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of com-
munication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written
request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record
pertains .. " Id.
All three statutes utilize a common and unique definition of the term "agency"
which is defined differently than in 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). The common definition is
contained in FOIA, and is incorporated into the Privacy Act, and into the Sun-
shine Act.
Finally, the Privacy Act provides under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (1979) that the FOIA
exemptions cannot be utilized offensively to deny an individual access to records
about himself authorized under the Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1979). Under the Sun-
shine Act, requests to copy or inspect transcripts, recordings or minutes of closed
meetings under subsection (f) are governed by the slightly different exemptions of
5 U.S.C. § 552b(c) (1979) rather than the 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1979) exemptions. See
also 5 U.S.C. § 552b(k) (1979).
41. See, e.g., 12 ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 431-431.09 (1978) and CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 9027 (West Supp. 1979).
42. The FOIA states that:
Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows: (1)
required Federal register publication of five categories of information in-
cluding 'substantive rules of general applicability,' general policy state-
ments and agency interpretations, and rules of procedure (1)(A)-(E) &
(2). Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make avail-
able for public inspection and copying (A) final opinions, including con-
curring and dissenting opinions, as well as orders, made in the
adjudication of cases; (B) those statements of policy and interpretations
which have been adopted by the agency and are not published in the Fed-
eral Register; and (C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to
staff that affect a member of the public; unless the materials are promptly
published and offered for sale.
Freedom of Information Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1979).
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increase individual access to personal records kept by govern-
ment agencies (while preventing some unauthorized disclo-
sures),43 and to ensure that agencies conduct their official
business in meetings open to the public (except when there is
statutorily sanctioned justification for a private meeting).44 Their
overall purpose is to ensure agency accountability to the public
while preventing unfairness and aiding public participation in
agency decisionmaking. This purpose is achieved by providing in-
formation on governmental activities and by affording opportunity
for citizen monitoring of agency business meetings.4 5
The importance of openness as a protection against arbitrary
action has been noted by Professor Davis. He states, "one valua-
ble weapon against arbitrary action is openness." 46 He also notes
that "although administrative hearings are generally open, more
than 90 per cent of the American administrative process is behind
43. The Privacy Act requires that individuals be allowed on request to review
records on them compiled by governmental agencies. Privacy Act of 1966 § 1, 5
U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1) (1979). It provides several safeguards designed to protect
against the unfair collection or use of government records against individuals in-
cluding: 1) opportunities for the individual to request correction or amendment of
a record held by an agency (5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2)-(5)); 2) limiting collection of in-
formation by government about individuals to "only such information about an in-
dividual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency
required to be accomplished by statute or by executive order of the President" (5
U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1)); 3) civil remedies for violations of the Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a(g));
4) prohibition on nonconsenual disclosure of information about an individual with,
unfortunately, eleven exemptions (5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)); and 5) criminal penalties
for some violations of the Act including willful unauthorized disclosure of informa-
tion (5 U.S.C. § 552a(i)). "Records" are defined in 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (4):
The term "record" means any item, collection, or grouping of information
about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not
limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical history, and crimi-
nal or employment history, and that contains his name, or the identifying
number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual,
such as a finger or voice print or a photograph.
44. The Sunshine Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(4) (1979), requires that "[eIxcept as
provided in subsection (c), every portion of every meeting of an agency shall be
open to public observation." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b); subsection (c) contains ten ex-
emptions, and the Act applies only to two-or-more-member collegial body agencies
5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (1) excludes most cabinet level agencies. "Meetings" are de-
fined in 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (2) and require "deliberations" by agency members on
"official agency business." 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1979).
45. Openness in government is an important check on unfairness and arbi-
trary action. Justice Brandeis put it succinctly: "Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." L. BRANDEIS, OTHER
PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1933) quoted in DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES-TEXT-
PROBLEMS 519 (6th ed. West, 1977).
46. DAVIS, supra note 45, at 518.
closed doors, even though the need for openness as a check upon
arbitrariness is especially strong when discretionary action is
taken without hearings."47 The reference here is to informal dis-
cretionary action, the "lifeblood" of the administrative process. 48
3. Enhancing Citizen Participation in Agency Decisionmaking
It is generally recognized that expanded public participation in
regulatory agency proceedings would produce a number of benefi-
cial results. Such results would include well-balanced administra-
tive decisions, representation of currently unrepresented
interests, and increased public acceptance of, and confidence in,
administrative decisions.49 To achieve such an expansion, how-
47. Id. at 519 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 440. Examples of the types of actions Davis calls "discretionary" in-
clude a prosecutor's choice whether or not to prosecute, or a policeman's choice
whether or not to arrest. . . . Professor Davis' work in this area is brilliant. His
major work on this subject is DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, A PRELIMINARY IN-
QUiRY (1969). In the preface of this book he notes:
I think the greatest and most frequent injustice occurs at the discretion
end of the scale, where rules and principles provide little or no guidance,
where emotions of deciding officers may affect what they do, where politi-
cal or other favoritism influence decisions, and where the imperfections of
human nature are often reflected in the choices made.
Id. at v. See also Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI.
L. REV. 739 (1976).
49. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., REPORT ON FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM, (Comm.
Print, 1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Moss REPORT]. The Moss REPORT
strongly supports the need for expanded public participation and the mechanism
by which to achieve it. The report states: "It is widely perceived that many fed-
eral regulatory agencies are closely identified with the industries they regulate."
Id. at 474. The Moss REPORT recommends four ideas to enhance public participa-
tion. These are the consumer advocacy agency, the Office of Public Counsel (FCC,
FPC, ICC), direct funding of intervenor's participation costs, and expanded infor-
mation about agency proceedings as well as reduction of costs of participation.
The report rejects fee shifting as a recommendation because of insufficient stan-
dards, contingent nature of the fees, and uncertainty of public groups as to reim-
bursement. Id. at 475-83.
The ability of agencies so inclined to encourage public participation and pay for
the cost of it is made easier by an opinion of the Comptroller General, dated May
10, 1976, in which it is stated that nine agencies have discretion to encourage and
fund citizen participation in their decisionmaking processes consistent with their
current statutory schemes. The nine agencies are the FCC, FTC, FPC, ICC, CPSC,
SEC, FDA, EPA, and NHTSA. Id. at 599-602. See also discussion of experience of
FTC under § 202(a) of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act with funding citizen participation and in particular the hearing
aid rulemaking proceeding. Id. at 101-09.
Lenny, The Case For Funding Citizen Participation in the Administrative Proc-
ess, 28 AD. L. REV. 483, 491-93 (1976). Other benefits would include: 1) encouraging
agency personnel to be more vigorous in their work; 2) greater articulation of ad-
ministrative standards and reasoning; 3) an important double check on health and
safety related regulations; 4) agency accountability; 5) citizen redress of griev-
ances caused by federal agencies; 6) check on government illegalities.
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ever, would require a confrontation with those obstacles to public
participation which currently exist.
According to the third Ribicoff report, these obstacles include
cost barriers and administrative barriers. With regard to the cost
factor, the regulated industries dominate the proceedings not only
in the level of participation, but also in the resources committed.
Indeed, the cost involved is the primary reason that citizen repre-
sentatives have been outmatched by industry.50 Additionally,
public participation may be severely hampered by such "adminis-
trative obstacles" as delay, inadequate notice of pending proceed-
ings, inadequate time, agency use of informal negotiations with
the regulated industries, and lack of uniform intervention stan-
dards.51
Recommendations for the solution of these problems have come
from varied sources. For example, the authorizing statute for the
Consumer Product Safety Commission contained a number of
regulatory reform ideas.5 2
The Ribicoff report recommended changes in eight categories,
all of which would enhance public participation. These recom-
mendations include: 1) expanded intervention in agency proceed-
ings; 2) elimination of administrative obstacles; 3) the
establishment of an independent consumer agency; 4) the estab-
lishment of public counsel offices in regulatory agencies; 5) com-
pensation to citizen intervenors for the cost of participation; 6)
more effective handling of public complaints; 7) placement of pub-
lic interest representatives on advisory committees; and 8) agency
review of regulations.53 Adoption of these proposals would en-
50. III RIBicoFF REPORT, supra note 7, at vii, 12-22.
51. Id. at vii-ix, 41-60.
52. The Moss REPORT, supra note 49, at 195-242. The report is critical of the
effectiveness of the CPSC under its statutory mandate, but notes the innovations
in regulatory procedures brought about in the CPSC statute. The report states:
The importance of this legislation lies not merely with its coverage of a
pervasive field of commercial activity for the first time. Of equal impor-
tance is the innovative method of regulation it employs. At the time of its
enactment, the Consumer Product Safety Act represented in many re-
spects the most advanced congressional thinking on the techniques of
Federal regulation. The Act incorporated a number of concepts of regula-
tory reform. Indeed, many current proposals for regulatory reform appear
to be its progeny.
Id. at 195.
53. III RIBicoFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 41-162. See also Rody, Governmental
Financing of Citizen Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings: A Practi-
tioner's Outline, 31 AD. L. REV 81 (1979).
hance public participation at the agency level.5 4
4. Easing Standing Requirements and Other Obstacles to
Judicial Review
Efforts have also been made to reform standing requirements
and to expand public access to judicial review of agency deci-
sions. The third Ribicoff report discussed a number of recent
United States Supreme Court "standing" cases 55 and criticized
what it felt was the Court's unduly restrictive view of standing re-
quirements. The report made several recommendations aimed at
easing standing requirements. 56 Expanding access of citizens to
judicial review of administrative action is equally important since
reviewing courts serve (in part) to protect citizens from unfair-
ness, arbitrary action, and mistreatment at the hands of adminis-
trative agencies. That protective purpose is clearly illustrated in
the standards of review contained in Section 706 of the APA.57
The Moss report recommends relaxing class action require-
54. Recent legal periodical literature discussing public participation, in addi-
tion to the articles cited supra note 7, includes: Goodman, The Role of Consumer
Advocacy Before the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 8 CAPITAL U.L. REV. 213
(1978); Mogel, Award of Attorney's Fees in Administrative Proceedings.-Is it in
the Public Interest, 49 Miss. L.J. 27 (1978); Comment, Inducement of Public Partici-
pation in Administrative Proceedings Through the Award of Attorney's Fees, 30
BAYLOR L. REV. 785 (1978); Note, Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceed-
ings, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 981 (1978).
55. I1 RinicoFF REPORT, supra note 7, at vii, 25-50, discusses, inter alia Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization 426 U.S. 26 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1974); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1972);
Association of Data Processing Services Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See also Note, Recent Standing Cases
and a Possible Alternatiz4 Approach, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 213 (1975); Note, Selection
of Administrative Intervenors: A Reappraisal of the Standing Dilemma, 42 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 991 (1974); Note, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action. A
Balancing Approach, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1358 (1978).
56. III RmicoFr REPORT, supra note 7 at vii; 25-50.
57. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1977). It states (in part):
The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed;
and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions
found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to Section
556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject
to trial de novo by the reviewing court. ...
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ments by congressional action to make it easier for citizens with
small economic interests at stake to aggregate their claims.5 8 The
report is critical of two United States Supreme Court decisions,
Zahn v. International Paper Co.59 and Eisen v. Carlisle and Jac-
quelin6O for respectively requiring each plaintiff in a class to sat-
isfy the requirement that a claim exceed $10,000 (Zahn) and
requiring the representative plaintiff to assume the cost of notify-
ing the class members(Eisen).6 1 In response to those decisions,
the report recommends amending the statutes to allow aggrega-
tion of class members' claims to satisfy the federal amount in con-
troversy requirements, and liberalizing notice requirements "so
that notice by publication is adequate where the number of class
members is large and where a significant number of individual
class members receive personal notice."62 The Moss report also
recommends the liberalization of standing requirements, ex-
panded use of small claims courts, and specific provision for class
relief in, for example, breach of consumer warranty cases "where
the amount of damages and nature of the loss make individual ac-
tions impractical."63
C. Increasing the Accountability of the Agencies to the
Legislature and the Public
This trend, like the others, is the result of current dissatisfac-
tion with the administrative process. This section will discuss
that dissatisfaction and the specific efforts in several areas to
strengthen agency accountability. These areas include: 1) sunset
laws; 2) legislative veto; 3) legislative oversight reform; 4) open
government acts (FOIA, Privacy Act, Open Meetings ("Sun-
shine") Act); and 5) expanded public participation. The discus-
sion will more heavily emphasize the first three developments.
However, the purposes of the last two will also be discussed.
1. Dissatisfaction with Administrative Agencies
Professor Schwartz has considered the motivation for current
reform efforts. He states:
58. The Moss REPORT, supra note 49, at 538.
59. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
60. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
61. The Moss REPORT, supra note 49, at 558.
62. Id. at 559.
63. Id. at 559-61.
The problem is complicated by current disillusionment with the admin-
istrative process. The goal of cheap and inexpensive justice by experts,
one of the chief reasons for setting up agencies, has proved illusory. The
administrative process has too often proved even more expensive and
time consuming than the judicial process. Even more important has been
the increasing failure of agencies to protect that very public interest they
were created to serve. The administrative process, which had once been
vigorous in fighting for the public interest, has become an established part
of the economic status quo. It has come to terms with those it is ostensi-
bly regulating; the "public interest" is equated more and more with the in-
terest of those being regulated. For the age-old central question of
political science, Quis custodiet ipsos custodes ("Who will regulate the
regulators?"), our system has given a new answer: Those who are regu-
lated themselves. 6 4
Others have criticized the federal regulatory agencies in a vari-
ety of settings. Irving S. Shapiro, Chairman of the Board of E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., questions whether all of the various
expensive environmental and health regulations, existing and
proposed, are still needed in their original dimensions. 65 Political
leaders, lawyers, and professors are echoing the reform theme.66
The movement for regulatory reform encompasses both "deregu-
lation" and reform of administrative decision making. The focus
at this point will be on the latter.67
2. "Sunset" Laws
The nature of "sunset" legislation is very simple and straight-
forward. Under such an approach, regulatory agencies, along with
their regulations and authority to issue new regulations, are auto-
matically terminated at a certain date unless reauthorized by leg-
islative action. The schedule of termination is staggered so that
only some agencies are lost or renewed at a particular time. Gen-
erally, the agency's performance must be legislatively reviewed
64. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 23 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SCHWARTZ
TEXT ].
65. Environmental Safety or Economic Waste, The Philadelphia Enquirer, May
31, 1977, § A, at 2, col. 2. See also Weidenbaum, Cost of Government Regulation Too
High?, Los Angeles Times, April 8, 1979, § 7 (Outlook), at 1, col. 1. Zero based
budgeting is grounded on the principle that each agency starts each fiscal year
from ground zero; in other words, no agency is entitled to the level of expenditures
of the previous year.
66. Political Leaders: See Kennedy, Regulatory Reform; A Confused National
Issue, 28 AD. L. REV. 447 (1976); Lawyers: Doub, Regulation: Restoring Public Con-
fidence, 28 AD. L. REV. 1 (1976); Kennedy, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administrative Agencies, 29 AD. L. REV. v (1977); Professors: Redford,
Regulation Revisited, 28 AD. L. REV. 543 (1976).
67. See Nerenberg, Regulatory Reform in a Nutshell, 62 A.B.A.J. 121 (1976).
Some of the reasons for the dissatisfaction which has triggered the administrative
reform movement are discussed in Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Ad-
ministrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1941 (1975). See also, DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TrVE LAW TREATISE § 1.12 at 52-56 (1978), discussing deregulation, the impact of
regulation, and the impact of non-regulatory spending programs.
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before termination occurs.68
The Moss report criticizes the "sunset" proposal because of the
opportunities for "special interest influence" 69 and the inflexibil-
ity of sunset review schedules.7 0 The second Ribicoff report advo-
cates sunset laws as a device for "systematic and comprehensive
review of those agencies' activities-something that has been
missing from Congressional oversight."' This report perceives
68. See Moss REPORT, supra note 49, at 528. With regard to this agency review
process, the Moss REPORT states that:
Under Colorado's sunset law, a Legislative Audit Committee is required
to submit a performance audit report to the Colorado legislature at least 3
months prior to the agency's termination date. Under the proposed Regu-
latory Reform Act of 1976 (S. 2812) introduced by Senators Percy and
Byrd, agencies are reviewed in the first instance by the Executive branch.
Reports of such reviews are to be submitted to the Congress in the form of
comprehensive plans which shall include recommendations for:
(1) The transfer, consolidation, modification, or elimination of
functions;
(2) Organizational, structural and procedural reforms;
(3) Merger, modification, establishment or abolition of Federal reg-
ulations or agencies;
(4) Eliminating or phasing out outdated, overlapping or conflicting
regulatory jurisdictions or requirements of general applicability; and
(5) Increasing economic competition.
Id.
69. Id. at 530. The Moss REPORT states:
1. Special interest influence-The most serious charge directed at sun-
set devices is that they will aid special interests. This allegation can be
divided into several parts. First, it is argued that powerful interests will
try to eliminate regulatory agencies which counterpose the public interest
against their private power. They will be aided in this effort by the sunset
concept itself, which places the burden of affirmative action on the agency
and the public. It is further argued that, even in a balanced struggle, an
unorganized constituency of consumers interested in safe drugs, reason-
able energy prices, or safe consumer products would be no match for an
affluent and intensely interested and disciplined industry. This criticism
has been partially accepted by several proponents of sunset mechanisms.
70. Id. at 531. The Moss REPORT states:
2. Inflexible schedules-The inflexible termination date of sunset puts
a straightjacket on the calendar of the Congress and a President. No one
can foresee what will require the attention of the legislative and Executive
branches of government at some future date. This Nation's recent experi-
ence with the oil embargo and related energy problems counsels flex-
ibility. If a crisis is at hand, sunset mechanisms should and must provide
for either or both (i) the possibility of delayed termination or (ii) limited
disturbance of necessary programs in times when the political branches of
government are addressing other pressing problems. The only bill which
seems to reasonably meet these criteria is S. 2925, the Government Econ-
omy and Spending Reform Act of 1976.
71. STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95th Cong., Ist
Sess., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION. II CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF REGULA-
TORY AGENCIES 135 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter RIBICOFF OVERSIGHT STUDY].
the sunset proposal as a valuable periodic review device which
can hopefully stop agency stagnation through systematic review
and reform. 72 A time limit has been proposed which requires re-
newal of an agency's mandate every five to ten years.73 This is
designed to enhance agency accountability. 74
Although several states (but not the United States government)
have "sunset" laws,75 the Colorado statute is typical. 76 It provides
(Subsection (1)):
The general assembly finds that state government actions have pro-
duced a substantial increase in numbers of agencies' growth of programs,
and proliferation of rules and regulations and that the whole process de-
veloped without sufficient legislative oversight, regulatory accountability,
or a system of checks and balances. The general assembly further finds
that by establishing a system for the termination, continuation, a re-estab-
lishment of such agencies, it will be in a better position to evaluate the
need for the continued existence of existing and future regulatory bod-
ies.7
7
The Colorado statute (enacted April 22, 1976) established stag-
gered termination dates for listed agencies starting on July 1,
1977, then July 1, 1979, and July 1, 1981. Agencies that are termi-
nated are given one year to close up operations. Agencies can be
reauthorized by the legislature for periods of up to six years. New
agencies are subject to the sunset law and have six year initial
lives. Prior to the termination dates, performance audits and pub-
lic hearings are required to assess the effectiveness of the agency
utilizing nine statutorily required standards: 1) public service by
qualified applicants; 2) compliance with affirmative action re-
quirements; 3) service in the public interest; 4) advocacy of legis-
lative changes to the public's benefit; 5) required industry
reporting on effect of agency action on quality of service by indus-
try; 6) agency required assessment by industry of problems af-
fecting the public; 7) encouragement of public participation in
agency decisionmaking; 8) efficiency of agency processing of pub-
lic complaints; 9) extent of required statutory changes to achieve
these goals. Agencies "have the burden of demonstrating a public
need for ... [their] continued existence."78
Although advocacy of sunset laws reflects disillusionment with
72. Id. at 129-35.
73. Ribicoff, Congressional Oversight and Regulatory Reform, 28 AD. L. REV.
415, 425 (1976).
74. See Adams, Sunset: A Proposal for Accountable Government, 28 AD. L.
REV. 511 (1976).
75. Among the states with "sunset" laws see, e.g., 1) Alabama, ALA. CODE 1975,
§ 41-20-1; 2) Arizona, ARiz. REV. STAT. § 41-2351 (1978); 3) Colorado, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-34-104 (1976).
76. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-104 (Supp. 1978). See discussion in SCHWARTZ,
supra note 6, at 59-63.
77. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-104(1) (Supp. 1978).
78. Id. § 24-34-104(8) (b).
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administrative agencies as solvers of public problems,7 9 there is
some question as to the effectiveness of "sunset" laws as a reform
device. Professor Schwartz notes "the Sunset concept is the type
of gimmick which all too, often appeals to Americans as a facile
solution to complex problems. It may, however, be doubted that
sunset statutes will really resolve the problem of the agency life
cycle." 80 Professor Schwartz goes on to comment that sunset
laws may be applied in a nominal and superficial manner by legis-
latures, pressed for time, and that the public will be deceived into
thinking a "real" (but in actuality, a "false") "safeguard" is in op-
eration.81
3. The Legislative Veto
The Moss Report describes the legislative veto as a device
which "would provide the Congress, either House, or its jurisdic-
tional committees with an option to veto specified agency actions,
usually rules and regulations." Supporting adoption of the legis-
lative veto is the "assumption . . . that regulatory reform is a
process of allowing Congress or one of its constituent units to
control or limit over-regulation by overzealous administrative
agencies through legislative veto."82 Typical of legislative veto de-
vices is H.R. 12048.83
79. Recent legal periodical discussions on the subject of "sunset" legislation
include: Adams, Sunset: A Proposal For Accountable Government, 28 AD. L. REV.
511 (1976); Christian, "Sunset" Laws-A New Approach To Congressional Over-
sight, 44 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 186 (1977); Muskie, Sunset. New Sunlight on Government,
13 TRIAL 47 (1977); Price, Sunset Legislation in the United States, 30 BAYLOR L.
REV. 401 (1978); Comment, Zero-Base Sunset Review, 14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 505 (1977);
Note, Model Federal Sunset Act, 14 HARv. J. LEGIS. 542 (1977); and Note, Sunset
Legislation: Spotlighting Bureaucracy, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 269 (1978).
80. Schwartz, Administrative Law: The Third Century, 29 AD. L. REV. 291, 294
(1977).
81. Id. at 294-95, (quoted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 71). See also Jaffe, The
Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183 (1973).
82. Moss REPORT, supra note 49, at 523. The report goes on to point out that
125 separate statutes include some variation of the legislative veto device.
83. H.R. 12048, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), would provide 60 days during
which a defined class of new rules would be subject to resolution of disap-
proval. If within 60 days of promulgation a rule is disapproved by a con-
current resolution of both Houses, it is void. Also if one House adopts a
disapproval resolution and the other House does not act, the rule is ve-
toed. Therefore, in the absence of a stalemate between the two Houses,
H.R. 12048 would provide for one House veto of proposed rules.
With respect to previously promulgated rules, the bill would provide for
"resolutions for reconsideration." Under this provision of the legislation,
the passage by one House of a resolution of reconsideration would require
The Moss Report mentions four concerns with the legislative
veto proposal described above. The report notes that the first of
these is constitutionality and warns that "caution should be exer-
cised with respect to conclusions as to the Constitutionality of
such devices." Two constitutional questions are at issue; the sep-
aration of powers doctrine and the effect of the legislative veto on
the President's power to veto.84 The report discusses the positive
answer contained in Justice White's concurring opinion in Buck-
ley v. Valeo,85 but is not persuaded by it. The second concern of
the report is the observation that Congressional review of all reg-
ulations would be extremely burdensome and not particularly
helful to the agencies. 86 The third concern is that adoption of the
legislative veto could give special interests another chance to in-
validate regulations to which they are opposed.87 The final con-
cern is that the availability of the legislative veto could tempt
opponents of adopted regulations to delay their implementation.88
This observation of the Moss Report supports the author's thesis
an agency to reconsider and promulgate a rule. Upon repromulgation, the
rule could be vetoed pursuant to the procedures applicable to new rules.
Id.
84. Id. at 524. Recent legal periodicals discussing the legislative veto device
include: W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, AND P. STRAUSS, supra note 7, at 116-122; Bunn
and Gallagher, Legislative Committee Review of Administrative Rules in Wiscon-
sin, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 935; Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Pow-
ers: The Executive on a Leash?, 56 No. CAR. L. REV. 423 (1978); Miller and Knapp,
The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367
(1977); Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution-A Re-examination, 46
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 351 (1978). See also W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, AND P. STRAUSS,
supra note 7 at 103-126 discussing generally the subject of legislative controls on
the administrative process including legislative oversight, legislative veto and
"sunset" laws.
85. 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
86. Moss REPORT, supra note 49, at 526. The crushing nature of the burden im-
posed on Congress by review of all regulations is illustrated by Table 1 at 527.
While selective review would be an alternative to reduce the burden, determin-
ing which regulations to select for review out of the great mass would be difficult.
See ACUS, Legislative Veto of Administrative Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.77-1
(1979).
87. Moss REPORT, supra note 49, at 526. If an industry lost a battle over adop-
tion of a regulation by an agency it could refight the battle in Congress.
88. The statement here was:
The procedures envisioned by H.R. 12048 automatically impose delays
and uncertainty on the rulemaking process.
By providing for "resolutions of reconsideration," H.R. 12048 makes pos-
sible substantial changes in existing rules. This can be done by one
House acting alone, both to force reconsideration and ultimately veto. If
an individual company has already complied with a rule, it might incur
the expense of changing to meet competition in the unregulated environ-
ment. Although the unrestrained competition could prove mutually de-
structive, the chance for a short-term competitive advantage will
encourage a firm to seek every possible delay in complying with agency
health, safety, or economic rules.
Id.
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that there is an interrelationship between the accountability and
delay reduction trends.89 The nature of this interrelationship will
be discussed in the next section.
The second Ribicoff report notes that legislative veto of agency
regulations has been proposed as a device to enhance agency ac-
countability to Congress. According to that report, the concept of
a legislative veto includes three options: 1) positive approval; 2)
disapproval; and 3) appropriations check. One proposal states
that a rule will go into effect unless, within sixty days of its issu-
ance, both the House and the Senate pass a concurrent disap-
proval resolution. A variation of this allows a veto based on
passage of a concurrent disapproval resolution by only one House
of Congress. Vetoed rules could not be reissued by agencies in
the absence of a statutory change. A new rule on the same sub-
ject would have to be promulgated anew by following APA re-
quirements.9 0 Existing regulations can be vetoed through passage
of a reconsideration resolution by one house. The rule must then
be re-enacted within 180 days or lapse.9 1
The Ribicoff report takes the position that while the legislative
veto may be constitutional under some circumstances, the con-
trolling question as to its use is a policy question. Arguments
supporting the legislative veto concept include the insufficiency of
existing oversight techniques, the alternative of legislation being
too unwieldly and time consuming, and the prospect of more care
being exercised by the agencies in rule making. Associated
problems include increased delay, and uncertainty.92
4. Legislative Oversight Reform
The Ribicoff Oversight Study notes one overall objective of leg-
islative oversight 93 of administrative agencies and six specific
89. The RIBicoff OVERSIGHT STUDY, supra note 71, at 117-120 supports the ob-
servation that one effect of the utilization of the legislative veto would be to
greatly worsen the problem of administrative delay. See also Ribicoff, Congres-
sional Oversight and Regulatory Reform, 28 AD. L. REV. 415, 426 (1976).
90. RIBICOFF OVERSIGHT STUDY, supra note 71, at 115.
91. Id. at 115-16.
92. Id. at 116-17. On the legislative veto, see also, Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1
(1941); Boisvert, A Legislative Tool for Supervision of Administrative Agencies:
The Laying System, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 638 (1956-57); Jackson, A Presidential Le-
gal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353 (1953); Stone, The Twentieth Century Adminis-
trative Explosion and After, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 513 (1964).
93. RiaicoFF OVERSIGHT STUDY, supra note 71, at 4-5. Oversight can be defined
to include: 1) "study, review, and investigation;" 2) "congressional efforts to re-
objectives. The overall objective is "political accountability in the
regulatory process." 94 The study notes that agencies are account-
able to the public by being accountable to Congress through over-
sight. This indirect accountability to the public results from the
fact that agency members, who are not elected, are not suscepti-
ble to direct public accountability in any other fashion. It is the
duty of Congress and the President to oversee the agencies to en-
sure that they reflect the popular will. Effective oversight also di-
minishes the probabilities of regulatory "failure."95
Specific objectives of oversight include: 1) monitoring agency
adherence to Congressional intent in the administration of laws
passed by Congress; 2) evaluating agency implementation, impact
and effectiveness of regulatory policies promulgated by Congress;
3) monitoring of efficiency and integrity of agency operations; 4)
prevention of arbitrary decisions and abuse by agencies; 5) ensur-
ing that the public interest is not forgotten by agencies; and 6) en-
suring that agencies don't infringe on congressional
decisionmaking authority.9 6
The Ribicoff Oversight Study made eleven major recommenda-
tions to improve Congressional oversight of administrative agen-
cies. These recommendations include: 1) "systematic review" by
Congress of regulatory agencies using "periodic authorization" of
all regulatory agencies preceded by a comprehensive look at an
agency's activities; 97 2) strengthening of Congressional access to
view and control policy implementation by the regulatory agencies;" 3) "an active
concern with the administration of policies during implementation." Id. at 4. See
Administrative Delay, supra note 1, at 129-136 for a discussion of the role of legis-
lative oversight in controlling administrative delay. See also Cutler and Johnson,
Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395 (1975); Fitzgerald, Congres-
sional Oversight or Congressional Foresight: Guidelines from the Founding Fa-
thers, 28 AD. L. REV. 429 (1976) (discussing legislative veto proposals and the
separation of powers doctrine); and Proceedings of the Administrative Law Sec-
tion's 1976 Bicentennial Institute Oversight and Review of Agency Decisionmak-
ing, 28 AD. L. REV. 569 (1976); Krasnow and Shooshan, Congressional Oversight:
The Ninety-Second Congress and the Federal Communications Commission, 10
HARv. J. LEGIS. 297 (1973); Pearson, Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected Congres-
sional Function, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 277 (1975); and Williams, Securing Fairness
and Regularity in Administrative Proceedings, 29 AD. L. REV. 1, 26-32 (1977).
94. RIBICOFF OVERSIGHT STUDY, supra note 71, at 5.
95. Id. at 5-6. "Failure" here refers to agencies becoming "captured" by the in-
dustries they regulate or identifying the public interest with industry interests
thereby losing their effectiveness.
96. Id. at 4-5.
97. Id. at vii, 44-48. The study also recommends "in order to enhance system-
atic Congressional review of regulatory agencies, Congress should require that all
regulatory agencies be made subject to a periodic authorization process." Id. at
48. Periodic, as opposed to permanent authorization, is a powerful weapon in
favor of agency cooperation with Legislative Committee review of the agency's ac-
tivities. In addition, it is believed that periodic authorization would have a positive
effect on agency effectiveness. However, only seven out of seventeen regulatory
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agency information;98 3) coordination of all oversight activities; 99
4) "evaluation of regulatory programs";10 0 5) increasing personnel
for appropriation committees;101 6) enhancing the value of hear-
ings;102 7) greater use of "congressional resource agencies" such
as Congressional Research Service, The Office of Technology As-
sessment, General Accounting Office, Congressional Budget Of-
fice, and Comptroller General;103 8) major recodification of agency
agencies are under periodic authorization statutes. The others have permanent
authorizations. Periodic authorizations are preferred to "sunset" legislation. Id.
at 44-48. Periodic authorization is similar to "sunset" laws in that both state a defi-
nite term for an agency's life.
98. Id. at vii, 105, 128. This recommendation has five specific statutory require-
ments: 1) that agencies transmit simultaneously to both Congress and OMB their
legislative and budget proposals; 2) that agencies submit information requested by
Congress within a set time period, or explain any non-compliance; 3) biennial joint
compliance review process by Congress and agencies to monitor, a) agency infor-
mation collection deficiencies; and b) agency tabulation and reporting of collected
information to Congress and the public; 4) congressional enforcement in a Federal
District Court of its subpoenas through civil or criminal penalties; and 5) protec-
tive legislation for agency personnel who report vital information to Congress. Id.
99. Id. at vii-viii. Specific recommendations to achieve coordination are: 1)
central reporting by all oversight committees to one Committee in each House
each session. Such information should be tabulated and turned into a report for
Congress as a whole to determine areas of "conflict and cooperation;" 2) annual
reports to appropriations committees of oversight committees' reports to standing
committees. Id.
100. Id. at viii, 58. This recommendation requires both mandatory agency pro-
gram evaluation and reporting of results to Congress. Evaluation plans must in-
clude goal articulation and assessment of goal achievement, hearings on plans,
and periodic specific reports to Congressional authorizing committees on agency
actions including: 1) principles on which regulatory programs are premised; 2)
ability of an agency to test those principles; 3) development of mechanisms to
evaluate the impact of agency rules; and 4) report on evaluation process and fu-
ture plan of attack. Id.
101. Id. at viii. The purposes of these increases are to ensure a more thorough
look at the agencies' expedition and priorities. Id.
102. Id. at viii. This would utilize three devices: 1) expand the number of ques-
tions served on agencies prior to hearings; 2) increase the use of post hearing fol-
low-up questions asked of witnesses testifying at hearings; 3) prepare post hearing
synopses of committee conclusions and develop a mechanism for ensuring that
agencies implement committee suggestions. Id.
103. Id. at viii. The specific recommendations here are 1) greater use of the Of-
fice of Technology Assessment (OTA) as an oversight resource through OTA com-
munication to Congressional staff and members 'of its abilities and qualifications;
2) reporting by CRS or GAO on content, adoption, and impact of proposed and
adopted agency regulations; 3) Comptroller General monitoring of quality and rel-
evance of GAO reports and minimizing time between request and Congressional
receipt of a report; 4) greater utilization of GAO staff for oversight work and
strengthening of Office of Program Analysis through increased funding and per-
sonnel. Id. at 8-9. The Congressional Research Service performs research and ref-
erence work for Congress and is very helpful with oversight work in performing
law;104 9) examination of the advisability and practicability of set-
ting up a mechanism to gather and evaluate data on Congres-
sional casework for oversight purposes; 10) use of the "legislative
veto" device only sparingly, and never as a matter of course; and
11) narrow drafting of regulatory agency legislation.1 0 5
The Ribicoff Oversight Study also noted several problems with
current Congressional oversight of administrative agencies.
These problems include: 1) overlapping committees;106 2) lack of
coordination;107 3) sweetheart relationships;108 4) low priority;109
and 5) lack of information.10
studies, developing charts, etc. Id. at 68-69. OTA was created in 1972. It can re-
search and evaluate programs for Congress. It is extemely helpful when it can:
provide unbiased information and technical expertise in the various appli-
cations of technology; secure, analyze and assess data about the effects of
technological developments; identifying existing or probable impacts
caused by new technology; ascertain cause and effect relationships, ex-
plore alternative technological methods for implementing programs; esti-
mate and compare the impacts which alternative technological methods
and programs might have; and report findings of completed analyses and
identify areas for further research.
Id. at 69.
The Congressional Budget Ofce can assist Congress and legislative oversight
committees by reporting correct, unbiased "financial data or fiscal forecasts ......
This information is helpful to oversight. Id. at 70-71.
The oversight study recommends against creation of a separate institution
within Congress specifically designated an "oversight office." It recommends ad-
ding a new section to GAO or CRS, or use of GAO's regulations unit in the Divi-
sion of Program Analysis to "analyze the impact of proposed and promulgated
agency regulations and to make recommendations based on its analysis." Id. at
136.
104. Id. at ix, 137-39. This recommendation calls for mandatory recodification
by both the agencies and Congress of statutes, cases, and administrative rulings
relating to a particular agency. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 94. The study notes that the current Congressional committee organ-
ization is ineffective for thorough oversight because multiple committees have re-
sponsibility for one area, (e.g., transportation), and because each committee has
such wide oversight authority, (e.g., several agencies), that each agency does not
receive systematic, periodic review. Id.
107. Id. at 95. The RIBICOFF OVERSIGHT STUDY notes that a lack of cooperation
and coordination among committees (between legislative and appropriations com-
mittees, with each House, between House and Senate) reduces efficiency in over-
sight, and wastes resources. Id.
108. Id. at 109. The study points out that lack of effective oversight may also be
attributable to "sweetheart" relationships between oversight Committees and the
agencies they oversee, and between Committee members and industries regulated
by a particular agency. Both of these lead to less oversight activity.
109. Id. at 107-08. Another problem is that oversight work is frequently not the
first matter on which a member of Congress will choose to spend his time. Given
much work and limited time in which to do it, oversight is often neglected because
the other activities are more interesting. This low interest is exacerbated by polit-
ical reality.
110. Id. at 102. The problem here is lack of timely compliance by agencies with
Congressional requests for information relevant to oversight. The solution advo-
cated is the imposition of strict time limits set by Congress for agency compliance
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The Moss Report"' concurs as to the relationship between ef-
fective oversight and regulatory reform. That report offers a
number of recommendations to enhance oversight."l 2 In general,
with such requests, coupled with a requirement of a written explanation of rea-
sons for agency non-compliance. Id. An interesting statistic here is that there are
roughly one hundred Congressional staff members who have oversight or legisla-
tive duties for regulatory agencies whose employees number 84,773. Id. at 106.
111. Moss REPORT, supra note 49, at 2. The Moss REPORT is based upon a study
of nine agencies: six independent commissions-the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Power Com-
mission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
the Securities and Exchange Commission; and three executive branch agencies-
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and Drug Administration and the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The purpose of the study "was to
look in depth at their performance to assess the validity of congressional man-
dates and the quality of execution and especially to question whether regulation
seemed to be serving a useful purpose justly and efficiently." The report ranked
the nine agencies into three groups: 1) High-SEC, FT'C, EPA; 2) Middle-
NHTSA, CPSC, FDA; 3) Low-ICC, FPC, FCC. The rankings were based on over-
all effectiveness of the agency in carrying out its statutory mandate. The study
notes the following-
The Subcommittee finds that the primary goal in the reform of Federal
regulation should be to make regulatory programs function more effec-
tively on behalf of the consuming public. We also have concluded that
regulatory reform can be accomplished only if approached agency-by-
agency and program-by-program and not with any sweeping, across-the-
board solution. It is irrational to subject economic regulation and other
types of regulations, including health, safety, and environmental, to the
same criteria and to the same solutions. The process of reform is thus la-
borious, requiring full recognition of the complexity of the Federal regula-
tory processes.
Although we firmly believe that reform must proceed agency-by-agency,
we have nonetheless identified certain common failings in the agencies
studied.
All suffer from a critical defect, an insufficient response to the public
they were created to serve. Our studies confirm earlier observations that
the actions of regulatory agencies reflect more than anything else their
primary attention to the special interests of regulated industry and lack of
sufficient concern for under-represented interests. Given the frequent
communication between regulated industry and regulatory agencies, and
given the cohesive structure of regulated industry, this finding should not
be surprising.
The Subcommittee has concluded that, if durable change is to be accom-
plished, there will have to be fundamental adjustments in the political en-
vironment of regulation and new structures for increasing the
accountability of agency actions to broad public interests. Regulation re-
lating to health and safety, in particular, must not be biased by extrane-
ous interference on behalf of special interests.
Id. at 3.
112. Id. at 544-47. The report notes that enhancement of the quality of Congres-
sional oversight should aid in regulatory reform particularly if there exists joint
House and Senate oversight committee meetings, yearly oversight plans and coor-
dination to prevent "duplication of effort and unnecessary burdens on the agen-
cies." Id. at 544-45. The report concurs in recommendations to strengthen the
it advocates "strengthening Congressional oversight to increase
the accountability of the agencies to elected representatives of
the public."113
5. Open Government Acts and Expanded Public Participation:
Interrelationship to Accountability
These two subjects have already been extensively discussed.
The reason for noting them again at this point is to emphasize the
relationship of open government and public participation to ac-
countability. Several examples of this relationship can be cited.
One clear cut example is the volume of open meeting act litiga-
tion in jurisdictions with "sunshine" laws,14-- litigation which in-
cludes ten cases having as a named party a member of the mass
media.11 5 One inference to be drawn here is that the media is at-
tempting to maintain accountability through exposure of public
body deliberations. Another example is the linking by the Moss
Report of recommendations for strengthening oversight with open
government recommendations and expanded public participation
recommendations. Such recommendations are described as "di-
congressional right to access to agency information and adds some new recom-
mendations. These include the setting up of an office of Congressional Counsel to
aid in oversight work, expansion of GAO investigative powers, annual agency re-
ports to Congress with highly specific compliance data, and authority for staff and
members of committees to take depositions when required "to obtain essential
oversight information." Id. at 544-47. Finally, the report advocates devoting more
money and staff resources to oversight, putting a higher priority on oversight
work, and protecting "whistle blowing" agency employees who in good faith ex-
pose "inefficiency, waste, or wrongdoing" from "reprisals such as firing, demotion,
loss of support staff, or transfer to undesirable locations." Id. at 546-47.
113. Id.
114. There are numerous sunshine or open meeting act cases. See, e.g., 1) Ari-
zona: Karol v. Bd. of Ed. Trustees, 112 Ariz. 95, 593 P.2d 649 (1979); Rosenberg v.
Arizona Bd. of Regents, 118 Ariz. 489, 578 P.2d 168 (1978); Arizona Press Club, Inc.
v. Arizona Bd. of Tax Appeals, 113 Ariz. 545, 558 P.2d 697 (1976); Washington
School Dist. v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 335, 541 P.2d 1137 (1975); 2) California:
Morris v. County of Marin, 18 Cal. 3d 901, 559 P.2d 606, 136 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1977);
Chronicle Publishing Co. v Superior Court, 54 Cal. 2d 548, 354 P.2d 637, 7 Cal. Rptr.
109 (1960).
115. These cases are: Arizona Press Club, Inc. v. Arizona Bd. of Tax Appeals,
113 Ariz. 545, 558 P.2d 697 (1976); Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 54
Cal. 2d 548, 354 P.2d 637, 7 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1960); The Tribune Co. v. School Bd. of
Hillsborough County, 367 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1979); News-Press Pub. Co. v. Wisher, 345
So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1977); Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. The Courier Journal and
Louisville Times Co., 554 S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1977); Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co.
v. Housing and Redevelopment Authority, 251 N.W.2d 620 (Minn. 1976); Channel
10, Inc. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 709, 298 Minn. 306, 215 N.W.2d 814 (1974); In re
Orange County Publications, Inc. v. Council of the City of Newburgh, 45 N.Y.2d
947, 411 N.Y.S.2d 564, 383 N.E.2d 1157 (1978); Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 43
N.Y.2d 370, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 372 N.E.2d 544 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977); WTAR Radio-TV
Corp. v. City Council, 216 Va. 892, 223 S.E.2d 895 (1976). Presumably journalists
were seeking the broadest possible access to deliberations of public bodies so that
press reports could be made of those deliberations and their decisions.
[Vol. 7: 553, 19801 Trends in Administrative Law
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
rected at creating new structures and a political environment
which supports rather than impedes regulation in the public in-
terest."116 The two specific recommendations are: "establishing
new mechanisms of effective public participation, to offset the
dominance of regulated industry in agency proceedings;" and "in-
creasing the openness of agency proceedings to facilitate public
participation.""17
III. RELATIONSHIP OF THE THREE TRENDS-DELAY REDUCTION,
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION EXPANSION, INCREASED
ACCOUNTABILITY
In this section, the three trends developed in the foregoing sec-
tion will be examined in an effort to illuminate the various ways
in which they interrelate. Initially, the interaction between delay
reduction and public participation expansion will be discussed.
Thereafter, the interrelation between delay reduction and ac-
countability will be noted. Finally, the goals and standards which
relate to the implementation of these trends will be studied.
The thesis to be examined is whether delay reduction can be
achieved without compromising expanded participation and in-
creased accountability. Also to be discussed is whether achieve-
ment of increased participation and accountability would be
compromised by delay reduction efforts. This section will con-
clude with a discussion of solutions including: 1) tradeoffs among
disparate goals and standards; 2) integrating principles; and 3)
methods of structuring citizen and legislative intervention in the
administrative process.
116. The Moss REPORT, supra note 54, at 3.
117. Id. The Moss REPORT defines public participation in a manner suggestive
of the public interest. It states "The term 'public participation' is generally defined
as input by persons or groups which do not themselves have a large or direct eco-
nomic interest in the decision." Id. at 469, note 1. The report goes on to note that
the quality of agency work will be enhanced by greater public participation in
agency decisionmaking, as will the agency's capacity to reflect the public interest
in those decisions. The lack of input by those not directly affected by the agency's
decision, the regulated companies, results in a greater likelihood that decisions
reached will not consider the public interest. The report cites several examples of
decisions reflecting inadequate public participation and neglect of the public inter-
est. Id. at 469-72.
A. Interaction-Delay Reduction and Expansion of Public
Participation
There are at least three views regarding the relationship be-
tween delay reduction and participation expansion. These are: 1)
delay reduction hinders participation expansion; 2) delay reduc-
tion enhances participation expansion; 3) delay reduction does
not significantly affect participation expansion. Illustrations of
each of these three positions will be given, followed by a some-
what deeper analysis of the interaction. This article proceeds on
the theory that the more accurate position is the first of the three,
namely that delay reduction hinders participation expansion.
However, this does not reflect a bias in favor of regulated indus-
tries or towards agencies who, like the FCC in Office of Communi-
cation v. FCC,118 fear change of the status quo. Rather, it is
contended herein that if delay reduction does indeed hinder ex-
pansion of public participation, then solutions must be devised to
accomodate both.
The first view that delay reduction hinders participation expan-
sion, is one supported by Professor Shapiro. 119 This position is
also supported by the ACUS.120 The second view, that delay re-
118. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See notes 126-27 infra.
119. He states: On the whole, the insistence of the courts that interested
persons, in the broad sense of the term, have a right to be heard appears
to have been beneficial. Some agency representatives concede that even
with the best of intentions an overworked and undernourished staff can-
not do a complete job of supplying information to the agency in every
case. The continuing presence of a broad range of representatives may
also reinforce the agency against pressures from narrow interests, espe-
cially from the regulated industry itself.
But the picture is not as idyllic as this hasty sketch might suggest.
There are occasions when reviewing courts seem to have gone overboard
in finding a right to intervene and a right to a hearing on a questionable
showing. Agencies confronted with increasingly crowded dockets and ex-
tensive delays have had difficulty persuading the courts either that there
was in fact little a particular applicant for intervention could add to what
the parties already in the case would present or that the opportunities for
participation were adequate to protect the interest of the applicant even
though they did not amount to full status as a party. Not enough attention
has been paid, in other words, to the applicant's potential contribution or
to the agency's need for expedition in handling of cases.
Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators,
81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 765-66 (1968) (emphasis added).
120. Public Participation in Administrative Hearings, 1 C.F.R. § 305.71-6 (1979).
It states:
However, the scope and manner of public participation desirable in
agency hearings has not been delineated. In order that agencies may ef-
fectively exercise their powers and duties in the public interest, public
participation in agency proceedings should neither frustrate an agency's
control of the allocation of its resources nor unduly complicate and delay
its proceedings. Consequently, each agency has a prime responsibility to
reexamine its rules and practices to make public participation meaningful
and effective without impairing the agency's performance of its statutory
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duction enhances participation expansion, is supported by an ob-
servation of the Ribicoff Studies that delayed administrative
decisionmaking hurts public interest representatives more than
regulated industries.121 Senator Edward M. Kennedy agrees, ob-
serving that administrative delay increases the costs of participa-
tion and thus decreases access of citizen groups who are not as
well financed as industry groups. 122
The third view is illustrated by then Judge (now Chief Justice)
Burger in United Church of Christ v. FCC.123 He noted that fear of
increased delay is the principal reason that the FCC opposes ex-
panded public participation. He stated:
The Commission's attitude in this case is ambivalent in the precise
sense of that term. While attracted by the potential contribution of wide-
spread public interest and participation in improving the quality of broad-
casting, the Commission rejects effective public participation by invoking
the oft-expressed fear that a "host of parties" will descend upon it and
render its dockets "clogged" and "unworkable."
1 2 4
He goes on to indicate that minimizing delay while expanding
public participation is quite possible. This is because the FCC
has the authority to structure citizen participation through statu-
tory rulemaking so as to minimize increased delay.125
The relationship of delay reduction and participation expansion
can be analyzed more clearly by focusing on the goals served and
standards utilized by each trend. This subject will be extensively
discussed in the section dealing with goals and standards. How-
ever, one example will be noted here. If we assume that delay re-
duction serves the goal of efficiency and that participation
expansion serves the goal of ensuring agency effectiveness in car-
rying out the public interest, then we can analyze conflicts be-
tween the two trends from the perspective of conflicting goals.
That will allow us to design goal balancing devices, standards that
accommodate both, and integrating principles when there is a
clash of goals.
An example of the conflict between the goals of efficiency and
procedural fairness is illustrated in the fourt Ribicoff report
obligations. . .. Whatever the form of the proceeding, reasonable limits
should be imposed on who may participate in order (a) to limit the pres-
entation of redundant evidence, (b) to impose reasonable restrictions on
interrogation and arguments, and (c) to prevent avoidable delay.
121. See III RIBICOFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 53-54.
122. Chicago Tribune, January 5, 1979.
123. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
124. Id. at 1004.
125. Id.
which contains a number of delay reduction recommendations. 26
One of those recommendations is to amend the APA to allow re-
striction of oral proceedings in adjudicatory hearings including di-
rect and cross-examination.127 While these restrictions may
improve the speed of adjudication, that speed may be achieved at
the expense of muzzling citizen participants who frequently seek
to challenge efforts by the agency and by the regulated industries
to equate the public interest with the industry's private interest.
That challenging role can be only partially fulfilled through writ-
ten communication. Confrontation and cross-examination of in-
dustry witnesses frequently proves useful. The report's
recommendation conditions the restriction by excluding those cir-
cumstances where "oral testimony or cross-examination is essen-
tial."'128
"Essential" is a key term. The Ribicoff report sheds some light
on this:
Oral direct-examination and cross-examination should ordinarily be al-
lowed only when the perceptions, memory, or honesty of the witness is at
issue. Except in circumstances such as these, agencies should not be obli-
gated to provide parties with the opportunity to develop the facts through
formal oral trials. But an agency should, in its discretion, provide for an
oral trial when it believes this will expedite the proceeding. 12 9
The fundamental observation is that expedition, a synonym of ef-
ficiency, is the guiding standard for exercise of agency discretion
to allow examination of witnesses when essential. This does not
imply the applicability of discretion to some other goal such as ef-
fectiveness, or procedural fairness. It only states that examina-
tion would be allowed only when the "perception, memory, or
honesty of the witness is at issue."
B. Interaction-Delay Reduction and Increased Accountability
There are three positions on the interaction between the delay
reduction trend and the increased accountability trend: 1) that
increased accountability absorbs agency time and resources and
takes time away from all other tasks; 2) the related position that
increased accountability hinders delay reduction; and 3) that in-
creased accountability enhances the effectiveness and efficiency
of an agency. These positions will be discussed.
The "time absorption" position is noted by Professor Strauss.30
126. IV RIBICOFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 8-10.
127. Id. at xiii, 55-65, 73-76.
128. Id. at xiii (emphasis added).
129. Id. at xvui-xviii, 55-65, 73-78.
130. At the time he made this observation, Professor Strauss, on the faculty of
Columbia University School of Law and co-author of the seventh edition of GELL-
HORN, BYSE & STRAuss, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, CASES AND MATERIALS (1979), was
General Counsel of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. He stated that:
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According to the Ribicoff Oversight Study, the impact of absorb-
ing Commission members time is heightened by use of oversight
hearings at which agency personnel are required to testify.'31
The allocation of resources toward oversight and away from other
tasks of the agency would result, given finite resources, in the rel-
ative neglect of other agency responsibilities. Thus, if the first po-
sition is correct, the effect of resource allocation decisions on
delay reduction is unclear. Delay reduction may be neglected if
the agency chooses to ignore achievement of efficiency goals. To
the extent that delay reduction is primarily the responsibility of
the agency, it may be neglected except to the extent that over-
sight focuses on efficiency.' 32
Thus far the discussion has focused on the impact of legislative
oversight on delay reduction. Other accountability devices also
impact on delay reduction. In particular, use of the legislative
veto as an accountability device can hinder delay reduction.133
This supports the second position. The Ribicoff Oversight Study
notes that agency rulemaking could be delayed across the board
because of legislative veto provisions which require 60 to 90 days
for initial House or Senate consideration of rules and 180 days if
[O]versight by Congress, by the judiciary, by anyone, tends uniquely to
consume the time of the people at the top of the agency. So one of the
prices that one pays for an oversight system is that you divert the atten-
tion of commissioners from doing the other things which they might be
doing-for example, from deciding some complex questions which are
before them, and which ought to be given their full attention.
IV RmicoFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 182. See also GELLHORN, BYSE AND STRAUSS,
supra note 7, at 125; Administrative Delay, supra note 1, at 71.
131. [Pjresenting testimony at hearings requires a large commitment of
time by the agency personnel involved. An agency such as EPA, which
presented testimony in hundreds of hearings over the past few years,
spends a great deal of its resources in responding to requests by several
different committees for testimony. The impact on the agencies of the
fragmented committee structure might be softened somewhat if there
were coordination between committees. Instead, the lack of coordination
between committees often adds to the strain on an agency's limited re-
sources.
RicoFF OVERSIGHT STUDY, supra note 71, at 96.
132. See Administrative Delay, supra note 1, at 132-33 (discussion of compli-
ance reports as an oversight device that could be utilized to reduce delay). The
Moss REPORT, supra note 49, at 546, 596-97, discusses the use of agency annual re-
ports. It recommends changes in the content of those annual reports so that the
extent to which "statutory deadlines for initiating programs, issuing regulations,
and publishing reports have been met." Id. at 546. Furthermore, the Moss REPORT
advocates oversight coordination to prevent "duplication of effort and unnecessary
burdens on the agencies." Id. at 544-45.
133. RmlcoFF OVERSIGHT STUDY, note 71 supra, at 117.
either House or Senate adopt reconsideration resolutions.134 Fur-
thermore, use of the legislative veto by Congress could subject
agencies to conflicts with statutory and court required time peri-
ods within which agencies are bound to act. The greater number
of rules that are subject to legislative veto, the greater the likeli-
hood that the regulatory process can become subject to serious
delays. 35 Others have opposed the legislative veto idea for just
such reasons. 136
Finally, the Ribicoff Oversight Study notes two related
problems with the legislative veto. One of these is that greater
use of the legislative veto could lead to agencies using adjudica-
tion more and rulemaking less, which in turn would lead to
greater delay in the administrative process. The other problem
noted would be the increased uncertainty which could result if
proposed rules are delayed in effective date or, at the worst, are
implemented and then rendered invalid by Congress.137
The second position, that increased accountability may hinder
delay reduction, is also supported with regard to "sunshine" or
open meeting statutes. Professors Gellhorn, Byse, and Strauss
suggest such a possible impact.138
134. Id. at 118. The burden of routine Congressional consideration of agency
rules is illustrated by statistics. According to the RIBICOFF OVERSIGHT STUDY,
there was a 1:18 ratio between public enactments of Congress and rules promul-
gated by agencies in 1974. There were 7,596 new or amended rules issued by 67
federal agencies. Congress, in contrast, enacted 404 public laws. Id. at 116.
135. Id. at 118-19. For example, the RIBICOFF OVERSIGHT STUDY notes that the
Federal Election Campaign Act has a 30 day legislative veto provision. Regula-
tions proposed in August, 1975 were vetoed by the House in October, 1975. They
were reissued in August, 1976 but the House Committee adjourned in October,
1976 without the 30 day time having elapsed. The reissued regulations could not
have become effective until, at the earliest, January or February, 1977. Id. at 118.
136. See Trister, Legislative Proposals to Improve Access to Federal Courts and
Administrative Agencies, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1023, 1037-38 (1977).
137. RIBICOFF OVERSIGHT STUDY, supra note 71, at 119. The ACUS "urges that
Congress should not, in general legislation, or as a routine practice, provide for
prior submission of agency rules for Congressional review and possible veto."
Legislative Veto of Administrative Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.77-1 (1977). In so
recommending, the ACUS notes that "[1]egislative review of substantive rules
would increase the workload of Congress substantially. Review of complex, tech-
nical rules would be difficult, time consuming, and often impracticable." Id.
138. GEL.LHORN, BYSE, AND STRAUSS, supra note 7, at 632-33.
Other factors of a practical nature may inhibit the effectiveness of the
Sunshine technique in improving public oversight and political respon-
siveness in the larger federal agencies .... [Tlhe mechanisms of doing
business publicly could make it clumsy, slow, and productive of painful
publicity diversions and delays. The greater time required to deal with
agency business publicly and the greater formality of that dealing, if in-
deed these are results, can diminish the available resources for dealing
with the agency's work as a whole "at the top."
Id.
This latest edition of a classic casebook, contains an excellent and thorough
treatment of the FOIA, Sunshine Acts, public participation in agency proceedings,
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The third position is that increased accountability enhances the
efficiency and the effectiveness of an agency particularly when
oversight is concerned with agency delay. This position is likely
to be correct insofar as it relates to oversight of agency delay. It
is also correct when enhanced public participation results in
greater accountability of an agency with regard to the goals of effi-
ciency and effectiveness.1 39 Similarly, delay reduction would lead
to increased accountability insofar as delay reduction results in
expanded citizen participation which in turn leads to enhanced
accountability of the agency to the public.
As previously noted,140 delay reduction is partially impeded by
participation expansion as well as increased accountability. In
turn, the latter two trends are impeded by delay reduction. Ac-
cordingly, an examination of the goals of the administrative proc-
ess is warranted.141
C. Goals and Standards
All institutional systems have goals (or ends) and standards (or
means) for achieving the goals. It is acknowledged that there are
five 142 general goals which relate to the decisionmaking activities
of administrative agencies. These five goals are: 1) timeliness
public support of citizen participation and the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
Id. at 579-61. See also Perritt and Wilkinson, Open Advisory Committees and the
Political Process: The Federal Advisory Committee Act after Two Years, 63 GEo.
L.J. 725 (1975).
139. See text accompanying notes 121-22 supra, discussing the position that de-
lay reduction enhances citizen participation by reducing the time and cost of such
participation. See also Administrative Delay, supra note 1, at 132-34.
140. See text accompanying notes 9-10, 127-29, supra.
141. Other illustrations of the interaction of delay reduction with the other two
trends include the observation in the RiBICOFF OVERSIGHT STUDY that periodic
reauthorization work under a sunset statute can be very time consuming to both
the agency under the review and to Congress. See RinicoFF OVERSIGHT STUDY,
supra note 100, at 133. Examples also include several advocates of the position
that increased public participation can exacerbate problems of delay. See, e.g.,
MURPHY AND HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 398 who notes the argument, but views it
somewhat skeptically.
142. There may be more than five. The five presented seem to be the most im-
portant to the author.
See Verkiul, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 CoLUM. L.
REV. 258 (1978). Professor Verkuil identifies three norms or values of administra-
tive procedure: fairness, efficiency, and satisfaction. He states "administrative
procedure should be concerned with the overall fairness and accuracy of deci-
sions, with their efficient and low-cost resolution, and in a democratic society, with
participant satisfaction with the process." Id. at 279-80. Verkuil's norm of "satis-
faction" is an example of an additional goal not stressed here.
and efficiency in administrative decisionmaking 2) procedural
fairness; 143 3) substantive consistency; 4) accuracy; and 5) effec-
tiveness in enforcing and implementing the agency's statutory
mandate. 144 In this section each of these goals will be examined,
along with the standards by which they are effectuated. An analy-
sis of the several issues which arise in connection with goal con-
flict will follow. Throughout this section, goal articulation will be
shown as a useful technique for resolving questions of the impact
of delay reduction on expansion of participation and increased ac-
countability.
The first goal to be discussed is timeliness and efficiency in ad-
ministrative decisionmaking. Professor Mashaw defines "timely"
as "a decision ... made within a reasonable or a statutorily pre-
scribed period of time after presentation of a claim."' 45 While "ef-
ficiency" generally connotes "effective" as well as "industrious," it
will be used here in the latter sense only. This goal, important
enough to be embodied in the APA,146 is effectuated through sev-
eral types of standards, including the APA "reasonable time"
standards. 47 These standards and others are enforced by the
courts.148 Other standards are included in Recommendation 78-3
143. This is not to say that fairness is solely within the realm of procedure.
While substantive due process is no longer in vogue, the fourteenth amendment
Equal Protection Clause embodies notions of fair treatment that are hardly proce-
dural in nature. However, it is more logical to deal with substantive fairness
under the heading of substantive consistency or one of the other goals.
144. See Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness and Timeliness in the Ad-
judication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L REV. 772 (1974). Professor
Mashaw defines three of these goals:
"Accuracy" involves the correspondence of the substantive outcome of an
adjudication with the true facts of the claimant's situation and with an ap-
propriate application of the relevant legal rules to those facts. Accuracy is
thus the substantive ideal; approachable but never fully attainable. "Fair-
ness" is the degree to which the process of making claims determinations
tends to produce accurate decisions. That a decision is "timely" simply
means that it was made within a reasonable or a statutorily prescribed pe-
riod of time after presentation of the claim.
Id. at 773-74. This author, by equating fairness with procedure, may be guilty of
advocating what Mashaw says is excessive emphasis on traditional trial type pro-
cedures. Id. at 775-76.
145. Id. at 774.
146. 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 558(c), 706(1) (1979). Both sections 555(b) and 558(c)
require agencies to act "within a reasonable time." Section 706(1) allows courts to
"compel agency action ... unreasonably delayed."
147. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b) and 558(c) (1977) and a discussion of timeliness
standards in ADMImSTRATrvE DELAY, supra note 1, at 73-92.
148. See discussion of the judicial role in Judicial Control, supra note 1, at 345-
87. In addition to the cases on delay discussed therein, see also Blankenship v.
Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1978); Ligon Specialized Hauler, Inc. v.
ICC, 587 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1978); EEOC v. Liberty Loan Corp., 584 F.2d 853 (8th Cir.
1978); Silverman v. NLRB, 543 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1976); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago,
559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976); Radovich v. Agricultural Labor Rel. Bd., 72 Cal. App.
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of the ACUS.149
The second goal is procedural fairness. The traditional defini-
tion of this term concentrates on "the extent to which accurate
decisionmaking should be supported by providing a directly af-
fected party with a trial-type hearing."150 A unique definition is
provided by Professor Mashaw, who states that fairness "is the
degree to which the process of making determinations tends to
produce accurate decisions."''1 The standards which are the
means of effectuating this goal include the elements of procedural
due process, 5 2 APA procedural rights,153 and the basic distinction
between legislative and adjudicative action. 54
The third goal of substantive consistency is common to all ad-
ministrative agencies but differs within each agency that has a
separate statutory mandate. It is not the purpose of this discus-
sion to delineate these varieties of specific mandates, but rather
to focus on the general mandate imposed by legislatures who cre-
ate administrative agencies. The mandates to which agencies are
to remain faithfully consistent range from the "public interest,
convenience, and necessity" language regulating the FCC as
3d 36, 140 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1977); Cornelius v. Minter, 395 F. Supp. 616 (D. Mass. 1974);
Nelson v. Sugarman, 361 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
149. See text accompanying notes 15-17, supra.
150. See Mashaw, supra note 144, at 775. Notice and an opportunity to be heard
are the fundamental requisites of due process. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
151. See Mashaw, supra note 144, at 774. While Mashaw's observations focus on
claims determinations in social welfare benefit agencies, his observations concern-
ing fairness are, in this author's opinion, generally applicable.
152. For analyses of the ten elements of due process required for a fair admin-
istrative hearing, at least in the public assistance context, see Burrus and Fessler,
Constitutional Due Process Hearing Requirements in the Administration of Public
Assistance: The District of Columbia Experience, 16 Am. U.L. REV. 199, 218 (1967),
and Comment, California Welfare Fair Hearings: An Adequate Remedy? 5
U.C.D.L. REV. 542 (1972). In addition, this author would add to the list of procedu-
ral due process elements discussed above and found in Goldberg v. Kelley, 397
U.S. 254 (1970), the right to a timely hearing. See discussion of due process as a
substantive standard, in Judicial Control, supra note 1, at 364-75.
153, See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. D.C., 435 U.S.
519 (1978) (APA states maximum procedural protections courts can impose on
agencies). See discussion of this case in Administrative Delay, supra note 1, at 93-
101. See also Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy
Controversy, 91 HA~v. L. REV. 1833 (1978); Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolu-
tion of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat Different View, 91 HARv. L. REV.
1823 (1978); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Proce-
dure, 91 HARV. L. REy. 1804 (1978).
154. Bi Metallic Investment Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); Londoner v.
Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 303-08.
found in the Communications Act of 1934,155 to the more specific
"unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity" language
that governs disability entitlement determinations made by the
Social Security Administration.156 The standards utilized to im-
plement the goal of substantive consistency vary with the content
of each goal but range from specific statutory language, to regula-
tions, to internal policy statements of the agency.
The fourth goal is accuracy. Professor Mashaw defines this as
"correspondence of the substantive outcome of an adjudication
with the true facts of the claimant's situation and with an appro-
priate application of the relevant legal rules to those facts. Accu-
racy is thus the substantive ideal; approachable but never fully
obtainable."' 57 Accuracy as used here deals both with fact finding
(what happened) and with fact application (determining the ulti-
mate or operative facts through the use of relevant legal rules).
The fifth goal is effectiveness in implementing and enforcing the
agency's statutory mandate. Professor Blumrosen discusses ef-
fectiveness as a goal, stating: "modern reform legislation contin-
ues to rely on administrative agencies to promote interests which
are newly recognized or supported. Much of this legislation is
floundering in its execution for reasons which include the ineffec-
tiveness of the administrative process."1 5 8 Other terms used by
Blumrosen include "impact" and "implementation." He seeks to
develop a general theory of "administrative implementation" as
well as requiring "administrators to adhere to the principle that
reform legislation is to be broadly construed.' 5 9 "Effectiveness"
differs from "substantive consistency" in that the former refers to
whether one implements a program and the latter to the princi-
ples used in an agency's operations.160 A major point made by
Professor Blumrosen is that there is a need for and a lack of stan-
dards for achieving effectiveness. He stated:
[R]egulation is a difficult and complex task requiring a wide range of
skills and capacities. The problem of the regulator is how to be effective
within basic principles of fairness. But where can the administrator turn
155. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1979). Section 303 states: "except as otherwise pro-
vided in this chapter, the Commission from time to time, as public convenience,
interest, or necessity requires .... " (emphasis added). 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1979).
156. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-429 (1979).
157. Mashaw, supra note 144, at 773-74.
158. Blumrosen, Toward Effective Administration of New Regulatory Statutes
(pts. 1-2), 29 AD. L. REV. 87, 209 (1977). Effectiveness can be defined as "achieving
or accomplishing; producing as a result." FUNK AND WAGNELLS STANDARD DIcTION-
ARY 421 (1977).
159. See Blumrosen, Toward Effective Administration of New Regulatory Stat-
utes, 29 AD. L. REV. 87, 89 (1977).
160. Id. at 90-91. It is important to differentiate between effectiveness as pro-
gram implementation and substantive consistency as fidelity to the public interest
not the interests of industry.
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for guidance and advice on this problem? Where are the principles, tradi-
tions and sound counsel as to how to be an effective regulator? There is
no text on effective legal regulation.
16 1
D. Conflicts among Trends and Goals: Goal Analysis
Once again, the thesis of this article is that, at least some of the
time, implementation of delay reduction impedes implementation
of expanded citizen participation and increased accountability.
Conflicts among these trends, as previously noted,162 can be ana-
lyzed from the deeper perspective of conflicts in basic goals of the
administrative process. It is suggested at this point that goal
analysis can be used as a method of predicting the interaction of
the three trends; of explaining harmony among the trends as a re-
sult of congruent goals; of explaining conflict among the trends as
a result of conflicting goals; and to suggest goal tradeoffs, integrat-
ing principles, and methods for structuring citizen and legislative
involvement. This discussion will begin with an analysis of the
goals served by each trend and will be followed by examples of
trend conflict and goal conflict.
The delay reduction trend serves the goals of procedural fair-
ness, efficiency (timeliness), and effectiveness. It serves procedu-
ral fairness because "justice delayed is justice denied." Delay
reduction also directly enhances efficiency. Effectiveness is
served when an agency is prompt in implementing agency policy
in an effectual manner. Substantive consistency and accuracy are
not directly served by delay reduction, which focuses on when de-
cisions are made rather than how they are made with regard to
fact finding (accuracy) or legal fidelity (substantive consistency).
The expanding citizen participation trend serves the goals of
substantive consistency, effectiveness and accuracy. It serves
substantive consistency if we assume that regulatory legislation is
designed broadly to reflect the public interest, that agencies be-
161. Id. at 90-91. The goal of regulatory effectiveness is discussed extensively in
the Moss REPORT, supra note 49, at 539, 550-56. The report states that three things
should be done to enhance regulatory effectiveness. These are: 1) "creating mech-
anisms to foster a regulatory environment that is supportive of effective pro-
grams;". 2) "reforming current agency practices to ensure evenhanded
enforcement of law and selection of qualified regulatory officials;" and 3) "reduc-
ing and eliminating duplicative, anticompetitive, and ineffective programs." Id. at
539. The report emphasizes stronger enforcement of current laws as well as peri-
odic review of programs and regulations to eliminate those that are ineffective. Id.
at 550-57.
162. See text accompanying notes 125-26, supra.
come "captured" and tend to reflect the interests of private regu-
lated industries, that this reflection is inconsistent with the
statutory mandate of a particular agency, and that citizen partici-
pation is necessary to restore the agency's balance and focus on
the public interest. These assumptions are frequently made by
advocates of expanding citizen participation. 163 Expanded citizen
participation also serves the effectiveness goal because citizen
pressures counter-balance industry pressure on regulatory agen-
cies. Thus, regulatory policy is less likely to be neutralized by in-
dustry pressures which produce paralysis or an ineffective
agency. 164 Expanding public participation serves the goal of accu-
racy insofar as the citizen representatives can provide useful in-
formation and arguments that are not otherwise presented by the
regulated industries or the agency staff. Accuracy here would be
served because the agency would have all the information that it
needs to make an accurate decision.
Expanded public participation does not per se serve the goals of
procedural fairness or efficiency (timeliness). Procedural fairness
is not served if we assume a dividing line between the public and
the normal parties to an administrative proceeding. Under this
conception, procedural fairness is satisfied if those who are di-
rectly affected by agency action are given party status. The divid-
ing line between parties and the public is described by Professors
Gellhorn, Byse, and Strauss.165 They state:
Other chapters have concerned themselves with the right to a hearing of
persons directly affected by agency action. Obviously the applicant for a
license, the subject of an enforcement action, or the recipient of a notice
of proposed rulemaking inviting the general public to submit comments
will have little difficulty in securing participation, whatever dispute there
may be about the particular procedures to be employed. This section asks
somewhat different questions: to what extent individuals outside the
agency structure can intervene in ongoing proceedings to present posi-
tions unlikely otherwise to be put forward or forcefully contended for, or
stimulate enforcement or regulatory action which the agency itself ap-
pears unready to take, or initiate the rulemaking process.1
66
This dividing line may reflect limitations in our thinking about the
proper role of procedure and procedural fairness, but it is suffi-
cient for these purposes if we assume that one who ought to be a
163. See text accompanying notes 28-31, supra.
164. See text accompanying notes 51-57, supra. In particular, see the RIBICOFF
REPORT recommendation that "full public participation in the regulatory process is
essential if regulatory agencies are to effectively discharge their mandate to regu-
late in the public interest." Id. at v. Note the emphasis on both effectiveness, "ef-
fectively discharge their mandate," and on substantive consistency, "to regulate in
the public interest." This supports the conclusion that expanding citizen partici-
pation serves these two goals.
165. GELLHORN, BYSE AND STRAUss, supra note 7, at 634-59.
166. Id. at 634-35.
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party is given notice and an opportunity to be heard.167
Similarly, efficiency (timeliness) as a goal is not served by ex-
panding citizen participation. The aforementioned ACUS recom-
mendation states that "[w]hatever the form of the proceeding,
reasonable limits should be imposed on who may participate in
order (a) to limit the presentation of redundant evidence, (b) to
impose reasonable restrictions on interrogation and argument,
and (c) to prevent avoidable delay."168 Similarly, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure state that "[i]n exercising its discretion,
the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly de-
lay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original par-
ties."169
The increased accountability trend serves the goals of substan-
tive consistency, and effectiveness. Substantive consistency is
served because one of the purposes of agency accountability to
Congress is to ensure that agencies follow Congress' will as ex-
pressed in enabling legislation.l70 Similarly, effectiveness is
served through legislative oversight, a powerful accountability de-
vice. This is illustrated by the Moss Report, which states: "[tihe
Subcommittee finds that the primary goal in the reform of federal
regulation should be to make regulatory programs function more
effectively on behalf of the consuming public."' 7 '
The goal of efficiency (timeliness) is not served by the in-
creased accountability trend, except insofar as legislatures focus
on timeliness and efficiency in legislative oversight. As previously
noted, 7 2 the effect of utilization of "sunshine" legislation and leg-
islative vetos may be to seriously hinder the efficiency (timeli-
ness) of agencies, and to slow down their processes of
decisionmaking. This is substantially true notwithstanding the
truth of the third position on the interaction of delay reduction
and increased accountability. 7 3
The increased accountability trend does not necessarily serve174
167. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
168. Public Participation in Administration Hearings, 1 C.F.R. § 305.71-6 (1979).
169. FED. R. Crv. P. 24(b).
170. See text accompanying notes 95-112, supra. In particular see quote at note
111, supra.
171. See note 111 supra.
172. See text accompanying notes 133-38, supra.
173. See text accompanying note 139, supra.
174, In this discussion "serving" means "directly promote" or "further." When
a trend does serve a goal it has a positive effect toward achieving that goal. When
the goals of accuracy and procedural fairness. Given severe time
constraints on Congress, oversight of agencies is limited to larger
policy questions, not the details. It strikes this author that, ex-
cept for systematic questions, accuracy issues are details that the
agencies concern themselves with, not Congress. Similarly, pro-
cedural fairness is more the province of the agencies initially sub-
ject to judicial review. Congress can always intervene and pass
legislation, 75 but the more frequent type of Congressional action
includes oversight hearings and reports, as well as legislation di-
rected toward effectiveness. 176
In any case, regardless of whether or not the author's percep-
tions in this area are valid, the purpose of this argument has been
to raise for discussion the concept of goal analysis. The preceding
analysis can be charted on a grid so that one can graphically see
the role that it can play.
Goal Analysis Chart
Expansion















X = Served P = Partly Served
As can be seen from the chart, there is some overlap in the goals
served by each trend. Note that effectiveness is the only goal
served by all three trends.
In order to see the usefulness of goal analysis, it is helpful to
look at actual goal conflict situations. An excellent example is
found in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. 177 In that case, "public interest" in-
a trend does not serve a goal, it does not have such a positive impact. However,
the trend may be neutral toward the particular goal. It does not necessarily have a
negative impact.
175. Congress can and does legislate procedurally. Such was the case when the
APA was enacted by Congressional action in 1946.
176. The Moss REPORT ranked nine agencies by effectiveness ratings. See note
114 supra, and accompanying text.
177. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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tervention in the administrative process and judicial review was
aimed at insuring thorough agency consideration of all statutorily
required factors, thus fulfilling the goals of substantive consis-
tency, accuracy in the sense of thoroughness of information, and
effectiveness in the sense of safety. However, the price of
achievement of those goals was the sacrifice of the goal of effi-
ciency in the sense of timeliness and effectiveness in the sense of
licensing approvals.
The conflict here can be illustrated by a factual discussion of
the case. In Vermont Yankee, two power companies sought con-
struction and operating permits from the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) (then the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC)). Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant Company (VY)
obtained its construction permit in December, 1967. It subse-
quently applied for an operating license. The hearing on that ap-
plication began in August, 1971. The issue of the environmental
effects of fuel reprocessing and radioactive wastes was handled in
a separate rulemaking proceeding which was completed in April,
1974. The adopted rule and the approved VY operating license
were challenged by intervenors on judicial review. The decision
of the United States Supreme Court was handed down in April,
1978, ten years after the AEC granted the VY construction permit.
Similarly, there was a nine year delay between the date of ap-
plication by Consumers Power Company for a permit to construct
two nuclear reactors in Michigan, and the Supreme Court deci-
sion in April, 1978. The AEC had granted the permits in 1972. The
granting of the permits was challenged by public interest inter-
venors and judicial review consumed most of the remaining
time.178
While data which outlines the increased costs incurred by these
power companies is not available, data is available for the simi-
larly delayed construction of the Consolidated Edison Company's
planned Storm King pumped storage hydroelectric facility near
the Hudson River at Cornwall, New York. A ten year delay in
construction (1963 to 1973) caused a tripling of construction costs
from 162 million dollars to 465 million dollars.179
The goal of efficiency also conflicts with other goals such as pro-
178. 435 U.S. at 525-35.
179. See ROBINSON AND GELLHORN, supra note 7, at 809-10. This facility was at
issue in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). See
Note, Of Birds, Bees, and the FPC, 77 YALE L.J. 117 (1967).
cedural fairness. Procedural fairness would require full ventila-
tion of issues utilizing adjudicatory hearing procedure as the
norm for administrative procedure.18 0 This requirement is pre-
mised on the familiarity of courts with the element of fair proce-
dure in civil and criminal litigation. However, adjudicatory
procedure is frequently the slowest form of decisionmaking.
One solution to this conflict is that used in Goss v. Lopez, 181
namely requiring less than the full panoply of trial type proce-
dures. 182 A better approach, however, would be for the agency to
explicitly recognize the conflict in goals. The agency in question
should then be required to prioritize the achievement of the vari-
ous goals it has identified. Generic standards should be devel-
oped through rulemaking which would resolve recurring general
questions and recurring goal conflicts.' 83
The potential conflict between the goal of efficiency and other
goals is recognized in the two ACUS recommendations dealing
with delay reduction. The first notes that "[wihen asked to en-
force statutory time limits, courts have recognized that an
agency's observance of the prescribed limits may conflict with
other requirements of law (e.g., the right of interested persons or
parties to a full or fair hearing) or with the requirements of sound
decisionmaking." 184 The goal conflicts recognized in this quota-
tion are between efficiency and fair procedure, and efficiency and
accuracy ("sound decisionmaking"). It states that "[ilf Congress
does enact time limits, for cases of any type, it should recognize
that special circumstances (such as a sudden substantial increase
in caseload, or complexity of the issues raised in a particular pro-
ceeding, or the presence of compelling public interest considera-
tions) may justify an agency's failure to act within a
predetermined time."'185 The goal conflicts identified here are effi-
ciency versus accuracy, fair procedure, and substantive consis-
tency.
The second ACUS recommendation states in subsection (a) of
the discussion section:
180. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
181. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
182. Professor Schwartz calls this "flexible due process" and devotes a section
of his administrative law casebook to the subject. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 341-
50, 370-89 (1977). See also Friendly, Some Kind ofHearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267
(1975).
183. This recommendation for using rulemaking procedures to resolve gener-
ally recurring policy issues is analogous to the rulemaking recommendation dis-
cussed in note 39, supra. "Generic" is defined as "pertaining to a genus or class of
related things" or "[hiaving a wide, general application." FUNK AND WAGNELL'S
STANDARD DICTIONARY 556 (1977).
184. Time Limits on Agency Action, 1 C.F.R. § 305.78-3 (1979).
185. Id.
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[Blecause rate cases differ in kind and complexity, as well as in their im-
mediate and future consequences, subjecting the decision process to un-
varying time limits would be unwise. Nevertheless, steps that will reduce
delays without jeopardizing the agencies' ability to bring relevant consid-
eration to bear on the decision of each case are urgently needed. 186
The conflict in goals presented is between efficiency and accuracy,
as well as substantive consistency in the sense of thoughtful and
thorough consideration of all relevant issues. Another example of
conflicting goals is contained in subsection (d) of the ratemaking
recommendation discussion. It states:
The present recommendation also reaffirms the Conference's earlier judg-
ment (recommendation 72-4) that "[s]ettlement of rate proceedings by
agreement among the parties is appropriate and desirable if the agency
... is in a position to determine that the disposition is in the public inter-
est." Implicit in the 1972 recommendation was the recognition, here ex-
plicitly stressed, that the interests of unrepresented groups must be
considered before a settlement is approved. Increased emphasis upon set-
tlement of cases should reduce the need for formal decisions and opin-
ions. 187
The conflicting goals in this example are efficiency (which is facil-
itated by settlement) and substantive consistency to the public
interest or other legal standards binding on the agencies.
The ability to identify goal conflicts, 8 8 to harmonize the con-
flicts, and to therefore hopefully fulfill all goals will aid signifi-
cantly in fostering the sense of legitimacy that agencies need to
function. Illustrative of this is Dean Freedman's identification of
"effective performance" and "fair procedure" as two sources of le-
gitimacy.189
In conclusion, the importance of identifying problems that in-
volve conflicting goals is illustrated by Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion in the Vermont Yankee' 90 case. The goal of efficiency was
186. Reduction of Delay in Rulemaking Cases, 1 C.F.R. § 305.78-1 (1979).
187. Id.
188. Other examples of conflicting goals can be stated. For example, the ACUS
states: "Legislative review of substantive rules would increase the workload of
Congress substantially. Review of complex, technical rules would be difficult, time
consuming and often impracticable." To the extent that the legislative veto serves
substantive consistency, its value is outweighed by the negative impact it would
have on the goal of efficiency. Similarly, use of the legislative veto could hinder
the effectiveness of the agency, particularly if regulations are vetoed after becom-
ing effective. This is a result of increased uncertainty on the part of the agency
and the regulated industries. Legislative Veto of Administrative Regulations, 1
C.F.R. § 305.77-1 (1977). See also RIBICOFF OVERSIGHT STUDY, supra note 71, at 119-
20.
189. See FREEDMAN, supra note 34, at 11.
190. 435 U.S. at 519 (1978).
All this leads us to make one further observation of some relevance to this
case. To say that the Court of Appeals' final reason for remanding is in-
totally subsumed in this instance by the ability of parties to ob-
tain judicial review "to secure the advantages of delay."191 The
following section on integrating principles will discuss the resolu-
tion of goal conflicts and/or trend conflicts.
E. Integrating Principles
This section will discuss integrating principles which can be uti-
lized to resolve conflicts among goals, and therefore among trends
serving those goals. There are four principles to be discussed.
These are: 1) identifying the problem as one involving conflicts in
goals; 2) identifying the type of decisionmaking process involved,
as well as the level, agency or court; 3) requiring the agency to
prioritize goals; and 4) if prioritizing does not resolve the conflict,
requiring the agency to make explicit tradeoffs among goals.
The first principle is to identify the problem as one involving
conflicts in goals. The two previous sections of the article,19 2 were
directed toward this proposition, (i.e., viewing some problems in
administrative decisionmaking to be a result ultimately of con-
substantial at best is a gross understatement. Consumers Power first ap-
plied in 1969 for a construction permit-not even an operating license, just
a construction permit. The proposed plant underwent an incredibly ex-
tensive review. The reports filed and reviewed literally fill books. The
proceedings took years. The actual hearings themselves over two weeks.
To then nullify that effort seven years later because one report refers to
other problems, which problems admittedly have been discussed at length
in other reports available to the public, borders on the Kafkaesque. Nu-
clear energy may some day be a cheap, safe source of power or it may not.
But Congress has made a choice to at least try nuclear energy, establish-
ing a reasonable review process in which courts are to play only a limited
role. The fundamental policy questions appropriately resolved in Con-
gress and in the state legislatures are not subject to reexamination in the
federal courts under the guise of judicial review of agency action. Time
may prove wrong the decision to develop nuclear energy, but it is Con-
gress or the States within their appropriate agencies which must eventu-
ally make that judgment. In the meantime courts should perform their
appointed function. NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for
the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural. It is
to insure a fully informed and well-considered decision, not necessarily a
decision the judges of the Court of Appeals or of this Court would have
reached had they been members of the decisionmaking unit of the agency.
Administrative decisions should be set aside in this context, as in every
other, only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated
by statute, not simply because the court is unhappy with the result
reached. And a single alleged oversight on a peripheral issue, urged by
parties who never fully cooperated or indeed raised the issue below, must
not be made the basis for overturning a decision properly made after an
otherwise exhaustive proceeding.
Id. at 557-58. Professors Gellhorn, Byse, and Strauss quote this portion of Justice
Rehnquist's opinion with the observation that "judicial review also can be used to
excess or for essentially political purposes or to secure the advantages of delay."
GELLHORN, BYSE, AND STRAUSS, supra note 7, at 916-17.
191. Id.
192. See text accompanying notes 142-91, supra.
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flicting goals which are unarticulated and therefore go unnoticed
and unexamined). Until conflicts in goals are noticed, examined,
and resolved, many of the problems bedeviling the administrative
process will continue.193
The second principle is to identify the type of decisionmaking
process involved and the level, agency or court. This principle is
basic to administrative law as the distinction between rulemaking
and adjudication,194 and between agency decisionmaking and ju-
dicial review.195 The elementary nature of the principle suggests
its importance to understanding administrative process
problems. 96 It needs to be emphasized for two reasons: 1) there
are varying conceptions regarding the nature of a particular deci-
sionmaking process, and 2) solutions devised for one process may
not work for another.
The first reason for emphasizing the type and level of the proc-
ess involved (that there are varying conceptions regarding the na-
ture of a particular decisionmaking process), is well illustrated by
contrasting the views promulgated in two recent law review arti-
cles. Professor Fuller states "that the distinguishing characteris-
tic of adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on the affected
party a peculiar form of participation in the decision, that of
presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his
favor."197 Hahn, on the other hand, emphasizes the similarities of
193. See Ayer, Do Lawyers Do More Harm Than Good?, 65 A.B.A.J. 1053 (1979).
This article won the 1979 Ross Essay Contest. Professor Ayer made an observa-
tion instrumental to the author's textual point. He stated: "Our criticism of law-
yers, however comprehensive, conceals some deepseated self-contradictions,
which often go unnoticed and thus unexamined. I don't think we can begin to
make sense out of our attitude toward lawyers and the law until we articulate
these underlying self-contradictions and recognize them for what they are." Id. at
1054 (emphasis added).
194. See, e.g.,- SCHWARTZ TEXT, supra note 64, at 183-85, 198-203. See also
Verkuil, supra note 27, at 294-303. He identifies six types of decisionmaking activi-
ties.
195. See, e.g., Professor Schwartz who differentiates between "intervention" at
the agency decisionmaking level and "standing to sue" at the level of judicial re-
view. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 391-402, 565-87.
196. Administrative law casebooks promote this distinction as one of the pillar-
stones of the basic course in administrative law. See GETLTHORN, BYSE, AND
STRAUSS, supra note 7, at 147-248.
197. Fuller, The Focus and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364
(1978). Fuller contrasts adjudication with "contract" serving "reciprocity," and
having "negotiations" as the mode of participation by the affected party, and "elec-
tions" serving "organization by common aims" and having "Voting" as the mode of
participation. Id. at 363. See also Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and
the Consultative Process: An Essayfor Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410 (1978).
all administrative decisionmaking whether adjudication, rulemak-
ing or otherwise. He states: "[vjiewed functionally, procedure is
a mechanism of information acquisition, exchange, and manage-
ment that contributes to the decisionmaker's determination."
Hahn goes on to note that "[t] his view of procedure also assumes
that the underlying activity-decisionmaking-is the same in
each instance, regardless of whether the label applied to it is 'ad-
judicative' or 'legislative.' "198 Professor Fuller also provides sup-
port for the proposition that solutions devised for one process
may not work for another, when he states:
[ilt is in the field of administrative law that the issues dealt with in this
paper become most acute. An official charged with allocating television
channels wants to know of one applicant "what kind of fellow he really is"
and accepts an invitation to a leisurely chat over the luncheon table. The
fact of this meeting is disclosed by a crusading legislator. The official is
accused of an abuse of judicial office. Charges and counter-charges fill the
air and before the debate is over it appears that nearly everyone con-
cerned with the agency's functioning has in some measure violated the
proprieties that attach to a discharge of judicial functions. In the midst of
this murky argument few are curious enough to ask whether the tasks as-
signed to such agencies as the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) are really suited for adju-
dicative determination, whether in other words, they fall within the proper
limits of adjudication. No one seems inclined to take up the line of
thought suggested by a remark of James M. Landis to the effect that the
CAB is charged with what is essentially a managerial job, unsuited to ad-
judication or to judicial review. 19 9
Fuller's comments emphasize the importance of matching the
task to the type of decisionmaking process, a concern central to
the second principle and expressed in the second reason.20 0 It is
felt by this author that the better view is that the differences in
decisionmaking activity outweigh the similarities, and thus the
agency should adhere strictly to the second principle.201
The third integrating principle is that agencies should be re-
quired to prioritize their goals. This is important because some
198. Hahn, Procedural Adequacy in Administrative Decisionmaking, (pt. 1), 30
AD. L. REV. 467 (1978); (pt. 2), 31 AD. L. REV. 31 (1979). See also Verkuil, supra
note 27, at 294-303.
199. Fuller, supra note 197 at 355 (1978).
200. Professor Davis developed the distinction between legislative facts and ad-
judicative facts in Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Adminstra-
tive Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-16 (1942); See DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw
TEXT 160-62 (3rd ed. 1972). The distinction is utilized to determine when an indi-
vidual is entitled to an adjudicatory hearing. The relevant observation here is that
when legislative facts are at issue, an adjudicatory hearing concerned with the
rights of a particular individual would not be helpful since legislative facts deal
with general policies.
In addition, there are other decisionmaking processes, such as ratemaking, see
text accompanying notes 34-39, supra. See also DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); and DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT 88-122 (1972).
201. While this author may disagree with Mr. Hahn, his two part article is a
brilliant discussion of administrative procedure.
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policy resolutions will enhance one goal at the expense of an-
other. To resolve the policy question while maintaining respect
for that latter goal requires a determination of the relative impor-
tance or competing priority of the two goals.202 Management tech-
niques can be utilized here.203 Once priorities among goals have
been established, then standards used to achieve various goals
can be reconciled and integrated, consistent with those goals.204
It is important to note that disparate goals will not always con-
flict. When that is the case, prioritizing is not necessary. It is
only when there is a conflict in goals, and hard choices have to be
made, that prioritizing becomes necessary.
Use of management techniques to resolve administrative proc-
ess problems is on the rise. The ACUS recommends that "[a]s
part of their positive caseload management program, agencies
should begin immediately to explore, develop and implement sta-
tistical quality assurance reporting systems that will indicate the
accuracy, timeliness and fairness of claims processing."20
The fourth and final principle involves the making of explicit
tradeoffs among goals, when prioritizing cannot resolve a conflict.
A tradeoff among conflicting goals, both of which can be fulfilled
to some extent, is an alternative to prioritizing when both goals in
conflict have to be accommodated. For example, the Moss Report,
in recommending expanded public participation in regulatory
agency decisionmaking, recognized that to fulfill the goal of sub-
stantive consistency, the goal of efficiency would have to be de-
emphasized or traded off. The report states:
202. For example, if first priority were given to efficiency, and fourth priority to
procedural fairness, there would be an emphasis on streamlined procedure and a
deemphasis on the full panoply of trial type procedures exemplified in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (prioritizing results in the achievement of the more im-
portant goal at the expense of the less important goal).
203. See Mashaw, supra note 144, at 775-76, for a discussion of management
techniques for a quality assurance system. See also note 11 supra, and accompa-
nying text and notes 7 and 8 supra, for a discussion of public administration man-
agerial literature on deadlines.
204. Standards as used in this context refer to the means utilized to effectuate
the goals of an agency. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (efficiency achieved within a
reasonable time), § 558(c) and § 706(1) (unreasonable delay) (1966). See gener-
ally, ACUS, Time Limits on Agency Actions, 1 C.F.R. § 305.78-3 (1979).
Similarly, citizen participation in agency decisionmaking is a means of ensuring
the goals of substantive consistency and effectiveness. ACUS, Public Participation
in Administrative Hearings, 1 C.F.R. § 305.71-6 (1979).
205. Quality Assurance Systems in the Adjudication of Claims of Entitlement
to Benefits or Compensation, 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-3 (1979).
[o]ur study has convinced us that all too often important interests have
not been considered sufficiently . . . because there has been no effective
way to present those views forcefully. Further while increased public par-
ticipation could consume decisionmaking time in certain instances, the
time will not be significant and will in any case be well worth the cost be-
cause the result will be decisions which truly reflect the public interest.2 0 6
The ability to make tradeoffs is enhanced by the separate devel-
opment of information regarding implementation of each goal.207
The concept of "hybrid" or hybridization (defined as "anything of
mixed origin") 208 is useful in understanding goal tradeoffs. The
trend of "hybrid" rulemaking 209 is an illustration of this principle
of goal tradeoffs. "Hybrid" rulemaking is described by Professors
206. Moss REPORT, supra note 49, at 470. The RIBICOFF REPORT reiterates the
need for tradeoffs among the goals of procedural fairness and efficiency. It states:
With its resources and official standing, a consumer advocacy agency
might actually be a force against delay as it attacks both agency practices
or the use of any dilatory tactics detrimental to consumer interests. To
the extent that more time is necessary to hear previously unvoiced con-
sumer interests, some further deliberation should be acceptable. After all,
lawsuits would proceed more rapidly if only one side were able to present
its case, yet our system of justice does not accept the loss of equity in the
interest of speed. Similar considerations of equity are also present in reg-
ulatory proceedings and should not be readily sacrificed to other procedu-
ral considerations.
III RIBICOFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 71. Tradeoffs result in the mutual accomoda-
tion, or achievement to a lesser extent, of conflicting goals.
207. The ACUS recommends such separate development. It states:
As part of their positive caseload management program, agencies should
begin immediately to explore, develop and implement statistical quality
assurance reporting systems that will indicate the accuracy, timeliness,
and fairness of claims processing. In designing such systems, agencies
should consider the need for information of a type that:
(a) Reflects differences in the types of cases and types of issues adju-
dicated and the stages of the administrative process involved;
(b) Identifies the management unit, or where appropriate, the individ-
ual adjudicator involved in order that effective action may be taken to re-
inforce success and to improve performance;
(c) Permits separate evaluation of (1) substantive decision-making,
(2) case development effort, and (3) procedural regularity;
(d) Enables separate evaluation of particular functions of the decision
process (e.g., issue statement or evaluation of evidence in substantive de-
cision-making.)
1 C.F.R. § 305.73-3(2) (1979).
208. FUNK & WAGNALL'S STANDARD DICTIONARY 656 (1977).
209. See Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicabil-
ity: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF.
L. REV. 1277 (1972); Williams, "Hybrid" Rulemaking Under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 401 (1975). Profes-
sor Schwartz, describing "hybrid" rulemaking developments notes that "[o]ther
recent statutes adopt an approach in between the notice-and-comment require-
ments of § 553 and the requirement of a trial type hearing. For examples, see the
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 2056 (1972); Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969 § 6, 30 U.S.C. § 811 (1969); Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1970). SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 277. See also
ACUS, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability, 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.72-5 (1979).
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Gellhorn, Byse, and Strauss 210 as follows:
In April, 1978, the Commission initiated a rulemaking proceeding governed
by special hybrid procedures under the Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a: A record is to be compiled;
although the procedures are generally informal, parties are to have the op-
portunities to show that particular disputes of fact exist, material to the
outcome, which require on-the-record oral proceedings replete with cross-
examination and the like; review is in accordance with the substantial evi-
dence test.2 1 1
As the description illustrates, hybrid rulemaking accommodates
procedural fairness by affording a trial-type procedure, accommo-
dates accuracy with regard to fact finding, and promotes efficiency
to the extent that the speed of informal rulemaking procedure is
preserved. The only caution here is that explicit goal tradeoffs
should be articulated by agencies when they "hybridize. ' '212
210. GELLHORN, BYSE AND STRAUSS, supra note 7, at 886.
211. Id.
212. Hybridizing is not always required. In an interesting decision by Judge
(now Chief Justice) Burger, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected a
challenge to the accuracy and thoroughness of a decision by the Federal Power
Commission because the decision was decided too quickly. This served the goal of
efficiency as well as accuracy. Florida Economic Advisory Council v. Federal
Power Commission, 251 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Judge Burger noted:
Petitioner claims that two defects resulted from the speed in which the
hearings were concluded and a decision reached. First, it claims it had an
unduly short amount of time in which to brief and argue its case. After
the hearings had been in progress for over four months, with petitioner
present and actively participating, petitioner on December 6 was asked to
submit briefs by December 15 (actually December 17, as the 15th was a
Saturday), and on December 13 was asked to submit to oral argument on
December 21. We do not find this so short a time, considering the need for
dispatch as to amount to a denial of substantial rights. There is no show-
ing that due to the speed, petitioner overlooked any important points or
was otherwise adversely affected.
Second, petitioner complains that the Commission decided the case too
fast; that in the time available the Commissioners could not have read all
the evidence and pondered all the issues. It is not for the courts, short of
flagrant extremes, to tell the administrative agencies how long they must
ponder before coming to a decision. The time spent in considering the evi-
dence cannot be held by us to be too little if it appears that the Commis-
sion has spent the time required to satisfy itself as to its findings and
conclusions.
We cannot say that either the statute or the Constitution was violated
by the Commission in not consuming a longer time in considering and de-
ciding the case. The vigorous dissent by the Commissioners Cannole and
Kline serve to emphasize the close scrutiny given by the Commission. Er-
rors, whether induced by haste or other factors, are always reviewable on
appeal.
Id. at 648.
F. Methods of Structuring Citizen and Legislative Involvement
in the Administrative Process
This final section will discuss the incorporation and integration
of a variety of concepts into meaningful statutory standards with
the express purpose of harmonizing conflicts among the three
trends so that all may be fulfilled, and so that the institutional
goals of the administrative process will be furthered. Amend-
ments to the APA will be suggested to harmonize expansion of
public participation and delay reduction so that citizen involve-
ment in the administrative process is effectuated.2 13 In addition,
legislative standards will be developed to harmonize increased ac-
countability and delay reduction. The integrating principles will
be reflected in both types of standards.
1. § 555a "Goal Analysis"-A Model Amendment 2 14
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, to
each "agency" as defined in § 551(1) conducting formal decision-
making procedures including "adjudication," as defined in
§ 551(7) and as governed by §§ 554, 556, 557; "rulemaking," as de-
fined in § 551(5) whether informal notice and comment rulemak-
ing as governed by § 553 or formal "on the record" rulemaking as
governed by §§ 553(c), 556, 557; "licensing" as defined in § 551(a)
and as governed by §§ 556, 557, 558; "ratemaking" and other for-
malized administrative decisionmaking procedures. 2 15
(b) This section applies to agencies deciding whether to allow
intervention 2 16 by an interested person or group in an agency
213. The need for such harmonizing is emphasized in Stewart, The Reformation
of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667, 1770-76 (1975). In a por-
tion of this article Professor Stewart notes with regard to expanded public partici-
pation in agency decisionmaking that:
[Tio the extent trial-type procedures are required, with the right of par-
ticipants to introduce evidence, and to cross-examine, a considerable
measure of delay and increased expenditure of resources will be involved.
These characteristics will be aggravated with the expansion of the number
of parties entitled to participate. Liberal grants of standing to seek judi-
cial review will promote further delay and require additional commit-
ments of resources (emphasis added).
Id. at 1770-71.
214. This model amendment is intended to appear in the proper statutory form.
"Section" refers to the statutory section as a whole, e.g., Section 555a.
"Subsection" refers to subdivisions of a particular statute. See SCHWARTZ, supra
note 6, at 49-52 for President Ford's proposed "agenda for Governmental Reform
Act." Section 4(b)(1) contains a requirement that purposes of legislation be
identified.
215. The sections mentioned in proposed 5 U.S.C. § 555a are part of the current
Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1979).
216. An excellent set of intervention standards is contained in ACUS, Public
Participation in Administrative Hearings, I C.F.R. § 305.71-6 (1979).
On intervention, see also Shapiro, supra note 119, at 765-66; GELLHORN, BYSE,
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decisionmaking procedure as defined in subsection (a), whether
such procedure is ongoing at the time intervention217 is sought, or
whether such person or group is seeking to commence an agency
decisionmaking procedure.
(c) This section requires agencies to determine whether
granting an intervention request as described in subsection (b) is
consistent with agency decisions required under subsections (d),
(e), (f), and (g).
(d) Each agency shall survey and determine the extent to
which its current decisionmaking processes fulfill 218 the following
goals:




(5) effectiveness in enforcement and implementation;
(6) other goals that each agency decides it fulfills or
should fulfill.
(e) The purpose of the determination required in subsection
(d) is to ascertain if agency activities are aligned with the goals
listed therein;219 to discover if any activities are burdened with
conflicting goals; and to integrate intervention decisions of each
AND STRAUSS, supra note 7, at 634-37. For a discussion of a definition of "an inter-
ested person" see also GELLHORN, BYSE AND STRAUSS, supra note 7, at 637-59.
217. The provisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 24 are very helpful here by way of anal-
ogy. The observation has been made that
[tj he typical setting for intervention in agency proceedings is like that in
which intervention occurs in judicial proceedings. That there will be a
hearing involving certain parties is already established. The would-be
participants, learning of the proceeding somehow, come forward with a
claim that they also should be accorded party status. The agency's statute
or, more likely, its procedural rules, will state some governing criteria,
often in terms reminiscent of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, governing entry to the pro-
ceeding.
GELLHORN, BYSE AND STRAUSS, supra note 7, at 635-36.
218. The ability of agencies to make such determinations would be aided by in-
formation collection systems such as those described. See note 242 infra.
219. See Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive
Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HAlv. L. REV. 547, 550 (1978). Professor Breyer advo-
cates an approach, a framework of analysis, similar to goal analysis which utilizes
determination of objectives. He states:
This Article concerns proposals of the fourth sort. It seeks to help formu-
late and advance substantive proposals for change by providing a frame-
work for analyzing economic regulation. The framework is designed to
isolate existing regulatory areas that are particularly likely to need re-
form. It also seeks to aid legislators and administrators deciding whether
agency into the overall goal implementation planning of the
agency.
(f) Each agency shall determine, after conducting the goal
analysis required in subsection (d), whether any of its decision-
making processes cause conflicts in goals which hamper the ful-
fillment of one or more of the goals enumerated in subsection (d).
(g) After making the determination required by subsection (f)
and, finding a goal conflict as defined in subsection (f), each
agency shall, through generic rulemaking proceedings, governed
by section 553 of this title:
(1) Rank each of the goals enumerated in subsection
(d) by relative priority, either generally, or by cate-
gory of decisionmaking process, so as to resolve goal
conflict through prioritizing, by making achievement
of one goal in conflict more important than achieve-
ment of another goal in conflict with the first goal;
and
(2) if the determination required by subsection (g) (1)
does not resolve the goal conflict, as defined in sub-
section (f), then each agency shall make explicit
tradeoffs among conflicting goals either generally, or
by category of decisionmaking process, so that both
goals can be accommodated and achieved to some
extent, although less than if each goal were solely
being fulfilled by the particular decisionmaking
process.
(h) "Decisionmaking process" should be defined broadly to in-
clude:
(1) the formal decisionmaking procedures of adjudica-
they should design new regulatory programs or rely instead upon alterna-
tives to traditional systems of regulation.
The framework is built upon a simple axiom for creating and imple-
menting any program: determine one's objectives, examine the alternative
methods of obtaining these objectives, and choose the best method for do-
ing so. In regulatory matters, several factors cause this axiom to be
honored only in the breach. First, although the defects of the free market
are widely recognized, there is no well-known systematic account of typi-
cal problems that accompany classical forms of regulation. Nor are the
potential alternatives to classical regulation, such as taxation, typically ex-
plored in any detail. Too many arguments made in favor of government
regulation assume that regulation, at least in principle, is a perfect solu-
tion to any perceived problem with the unregulated marketplace. But reg-
ulation embodies its own typical defects. One of this Article's objectives
is to present these defects systematically, so that legislators, administra-
tors, and others will find it easier to match regulatory goals with regula-
tory systems (emphasis added) (footnotes deleted).
Id. at 550-51.
[Vol. 7: 553, 19801 Trends in Administrative Law
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tion, rulemaking, licensing, and ratemaking as de-
fined in subsection (a);
(2) agency determinations under § 552, § 552a, and
§ 552b of this title;
(3) informal agency action involving exercises of agency
discretion to the extent feasible.
(i) In making the determinations required under subsections
(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g), agencies shall determine, to the ex-
tent feasible, the impact of judicial review, as defined in agency
statutes, including but not limited to §§ 701-706 of this title, upon
the fulfillment of agency goals as defined in subsection (d). In
making the determinations required under this subsection, agen-
cies shall proceed through generic rulemaking proceedings, gov-
erned by section 553 of this title, either generally or by category of
decisionmaking activity, and shall consider.
(1) the impact of agency intervention decisions on the
ability of intervenors to obtain standing for judicial
review of agency action;220 and
(2) the effect of judicial review on the agency including
time elapsed during such review as well as the quali-
ty of the result achieved;
(3) the resource costs of such review to the agency, and
to affected parties.
(j) Each agency shall consider, when feasible, the effect on the
determinations required under subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g)
of multi-party, multi-agency proceedings. The determination re-
quired by this subsection should be made, when feasible, on an
individual case basis in cooperation with other agencies also hav-
ing responsibility for parts of an individual case.221
220. Professor Stewart suggests that intervenors, particularly public interest in-
tervenors, will be tempted to seek judicial review to cause additional delays in the
effective date of an agency's decision in particular cases. Stewart, supra note 214,
at 1770-76.
221. The ability of a particular agency to achieve discrete goals can be compli-
cated immensely if multiple parties are involved. The complexity is increased
when multiple agencies are present and when several courts become involved in a
particularly large case. A good example of this phenomenon is the Sohio case.
Standard Oil Company of Ohio wanted to build a pipeline from Southern Califor-
nia to carry Alaskan crude oil to Texas. Agencies involved in the pipeline approval
process, which had to issue permits before the project could proceed, included pol-
lution agencies such as the Air Quality Management District for Southern Califor-
nia (SCAQMD), an arm- of the State Air Resources Board; land development
control agencies; South Coast Regional Commission of the California Coastal
In addition to adding a goal analysis section to the APA, the
provisions of the APA that are timeliness standards should be re-
written, because these sections 222 "have contributed little to the
reduction of delay."223
2. § 555b "Timeliness Standards" 22 4 --A Model Amendment
(a) This section is intended to integrate the current "within a
reasonable time" language of § 555(b) and § 558(c) with the re-
quirements of section 555a. These two sections, 555a and 555b
should be construed consistently with each other. Section 555b
should be used as a guide by courts asked to "compel agency ac-
tion ... unreasonably delayed" under § 706(1) of this title.
(b) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, to
each "agency" as defined in § 551(1) conducting formal decision-
making procedures including "adjudication," as defined in
§ 551(7) and as governed by §§ 554, 556, 557; "rulemaking" as de-
fined in § 551(5) whether informal notice and comment rulemak-
ing as governed by § 553 or formal "on the record" rulemaking as
governed by §§ 553(c), 556, 557; "licensing" as defined in § 551(9)
and as governed by §§ 556, 557, 558; "ratemaking" and other for-
malized administrative procedures. 225
(c) Each agency shall, by rulemaking proceeding pursuant to
§ 553 of this title, develop specific time period timeliness stan-
dards 226 within two calendar years of the date of this enactment.
Commission; and energy development agencies such as the Federal Department of
Energy. This type of multi-party, multi-agency decision making will increase as
the development of alternative energy sources ("synfuel") proceeds in the 1980's.
222. 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 558(c), 706(1) (1966).
223. Tomlinson notes that:
[C]ourts have not developed worthwhile rules for determining what con-
stitutes an unlawful or unreasonable delay and have granted relief from
the effects of delay only on a haphazard basis and in egregious cases. The
vagueness of the statutory terms is only partially responsible for this situ-
ation. Courts have also held that these statutory provisions do not affect
the broad discretion enjoyed by most agencies to allocate their limited re-
sources among the competing demands for their attention. (footnotes
omitted).
Tomlinson, supra note 8, at 1. Tomlinson discusses judicial efforts to construe spe-
cific time period standards, e.g., Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution
Force, 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976); NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Forth Worth Nat. Corp. v. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp., 469 F.2d 471
(5th Cir. 1972); Maryland Casualty Company v. Cardillo, 99 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir.
1938); Diamond Match Co. v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 952 (Customs Ct. 1960).
224. See Administrative Delay, supra note 1, at 73-92. Proposed § 555b draws
heavily on ACUS Recommendation 78-3, Time Limits on Agency Action, 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.78-3 (1979).
225. The language of proposed 5 U.S.C. § 555b(b) is identical to that of proposed
5 U.S.C. § 555a(a).
226. See Administrative Delay, supra note 1, at 74-76.
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Such standards shall be articulated separately for each of the fol-
lowing decisionmaking processes:
(1) adjudication;
(2) notice and comment rulemaking as defined in sub-
section (b);
(3) "hybrid" rulemaking;227




(7) "clearance activities; '229
(8) other quantifiable agency decisionmaking activi-
ties. 2
30
(d) Each agency shall, when developing the standards re-
quired by subsection (c), provide "escape clauses," 23 1 the effect of
which would be to justify noncompliance with a specific time pe-
riod standard developed in subsection (c).
(e) The "escape clauses," established pursuant to subsection
(d) by agencies shall be one of the following three types:
(1) "reasons justifying noncompliance; '232 or
(2) "deadline extension;"233 or
(3) "time exclusion;" 234
(f) "Escape clauses" pursuant to section (f) shall be estab-
lished by agencies for any of the following justifications:
(1) "a sudden substantial increase in the agency's
227. See text accompanying notes 209-13, supra.
228. See Morgan, supra note 23, at 23.
229. See Tomlinson, supra note 8, at 15-17. See also Verkuil, supra note 27, at
263.
230. Subsection (c) draws on two specific parts of ACUS Recommendation No.
78-3: 1) the subsection (1) statement that "generally it is preferable that such lim-
its be established by the agencies themselves, rather than by statute,"; 2) the sub-
section (3) requirement that agencies set their deadlines "elther by announcing
schedules for particular agency proceedings or by adopting regulations that con-
tain general timetables for dealing with categories of the agency's proceedings."
This author believes the latter route is better, and feels it is permissible for Con-
gress to require, agencies to set their own deadlines. See also Administrative De-
lay, supra note 1, at 84-87.
231. Administrative Delay, supra note 1, at 76, 89-90.
232. Id.
233. Id. This is the type of clause preferred by this author.
234. Id.
caseload;" 235
(2) "complexity of the issues raised in a particular pro-
ceeding;" 236
(3) "presence of compelling public interest considera-
tions;"237
(4) "delay caused by or requested by one of the par-
ties;" 2 3
8
(5) other unusual circumstances which, in good faith,
prevent the agency from meeting the articulated
standard.239
(g) Each agency developing the standards required by subsec-
tions (c), (d), (e), and (f), shall report, by annual compliance re-
port,240 to Congress on that agency's progress (1) in adopting the
standards required by subsections (c), (d), and (e); and (2) in
meeting the standards so required. The reports required by this
subsection shall be subdivided by decisionmaking process as
stated in subsection (c). In addition, each agency shall report to
affected parties in individual cases the agency's compliance or
lack thereof with the standards required herein.24 1
(h) If any agency fails, without good cause, to adopt the stan-
dards required in subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f) within the
time period specified in subsection (c), Congress shall, at the ear-
liest feasible time, adopt such standards for such agency. Con-
gress shall follow the requirements of subsections (c), (d), (e),
(f), in so adopting such standards, and shall enact such standards
as amendments to the agency's authorizing statutes. 242
235. Subsection 4) of ACUS, Recommendation No. 78-3 is the source of justifica-
tions (f) (1), (2), (3). It states in part:
[i]f Congress does enact time limits, for cases of any type, it should recog-
nize that special circumstances (such as a sudden substantial increase in
caseload, or complexity of the issues raised in a particular proceeding, or
the presence of compelling public interest considerations) may justify an
agency's failure to act within a predetermined time.
1 C.F.R. § 305.78-3 (1979).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See Administrative Delay, supra note 1, at 89.
239. The requirement of good faith is imposed to ensure that agencies do not
utilize justification (5) to swallow up a deadline.
240. See Administrative Delay, supra note 1, at 132-33.
241. Subsections 2) and 4) of ACUS Recommendation No. 78-3 both require
such reports. Subsection 2) states in part: "It may also require that significant de-
partures from agency-adopted timetables may be explained in current status re-
ports." Subsection 4) states in part: "Statutes fixing limits within which agency
adjudication must be completed should ordinarily require that an agency's depar-
ture from the legislative timetable be explained in current status reports to af-
fected persons or in a report to Congress." 1 C.F.R. § 305.78-3(2) and (4) (1979).
242. Subsection 2) of ACUS Recommendation No. 78-3 states "[b]efore deter-
mining to impose statutory time limits on agencies for the conduct of agency pro-
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(i) Standards enacted by agencies or Congress pursuant to
this section should be reviewed for accuracy by the agency bound
by the standard at least every two years to determine if the stan-
dard is still accurate and realistic. The Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States may aid agencies in this review
process. 2 4
3
(j) Timeliness standards adopted pursuant to this section are
enforceable by a private right of action 244 that may be brought by
"aggrieved or affected persons"245 in the federal court that has ju-
risdiction over the particular agency. Subject matter jurisdiction
over actions brought under this subsection shall be provided by
§ 1331 of title 28, if the reviewing court is a district court of the
United States, or shall be provided by a judicial review provision
in the enabling statute of the particular agency.246
(k) The language of § 555b and § 558c, "within a reasonable
time," shall be construed consistently with the requirements of
this section.247
Finally, legislative intervention standards should be drafted to
ensure that increased accountability is harmonized with delay re-
ceedings, Congress should give due consideration to the alternative of requiring
the agency itself to establish timetables or guidelines for the prompt disposition of
various types of proceedings conducted by it." 1 C.F.R. § 305.78-3(2) (1979).
243. The ACUS, in Recommendation 78-3 at subsection 6) states:
If Congress does impose a statutory time limit on agency decisionmaking,
whether in adjudicatory or rulemaking matters, it should be attentive to
the need for revision. A time limit considered desirable at the outset may
prove to have been unrealistic because it was based on incomplete infor-
mation. If realistic at the time of enactment, the limit may cease to be so
with the passage of time. Statutes imposing time limits therefore should
provide for periodic reconsideration by the Congress or grant the agency
authority to revise the limits under standards established by the Con-
gress.
1 C.F.R. § 305.78-3(6) (1979).
244. Subsection 7) states:
If a statutory time limit is imposed, Congress should expressly state
whether affected persons may enforce the time limit through judicial ac-
tion and, if so, the nature of the relief available for this purpose. In cases
where the time limit is intended only as a norm by which the agency's
performance is to be measured, a requirement that the agency report de-
viations from the time limit to Congress may be a desirable means of as-
suring oversight of its performance.
1 C.F.R. § 305.78-3(7) (1979).
245. See 702 of the APA, (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1979)).
246. See note 234 supra.
247. The author prefers integrating the proposed new § 555b with current APA
timeliness language, rather than deleting that language and rewriting §§ 555(b)
and 558(c).
duction, and to ensure that agencies are able to fulfill their goals.
These standards should be enacted by Congress but should be
separately codified in the United States Code, rather than in-
cluded in the APA.
3. § 600 Legislative Intervention Standards-A Model
Amendment 248
(a) In ensuring the accountability of administrative agencies
to Congress and the American people, Congress should conduct
legislative oversight of those agencies consistent with the princi-
ples stated in this section.
(b) Congress should conduct oversight primarily through the
traditional methods of oversight committees. In so doing, to mini-
mize the drain on agency resources, there should be coordina-
tion 249 of oversight activities and consolidation of oversight
hearings, between legislative and appropriations committees,
among each house, and between House and Senate.250
(c) The legislative veto should not normally be used as an ac-
countability device because of its impact on agency goals, in par-
ticular, the goals of effectiveness and efficiency, as well as the
crushing burden on Congress imposed by review of regulations. 25'
(d) Periodic reauthorization of administrative agencies with
mandatory review should not be substituted for oversight by com-
mittee required by subsection (b). Such reauthorization has the
potential for endangering agency fulfillment of the goals of effec-
tiveness and efficiency. In addition, the time required for such
reauthorization poses heavy pressures on Congress. 25 2
(e) In conducting oversight, Congress should emphasize the
use of agency compliance reports, and interrogatories, and deem-
phasize oral hearings which are time consuming for both the
agency and the committee hearing testimony.253
These standards are only a first step toward structuring legisla-
tive intervention in the administrative process. They are intended
to stimulate further discussion of others on this subject.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has examined three current trends in American ad-
248. These standards draw heavily from the Moss REPORT, note 49 supra, and
the RmIBCOFF OVERSIGHT STUDY, note 71 supra. See text at notes 68-81 (sunset
laws), 84-94 (legislative veto) and 93-114 (legislative oversight reform) supra.
249. See notes 99, 106-08 supra, and accompanying text.
250. Id.
251. See notes 82-92 supra, and accompanying text.
252. See notes 68-81 supra, and accompanying text.
253. See text accompanying note 98, supra.
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ministrative law. These trends are reduction in administrative de-
lay, expansion of citizen access to and public participation in
administrative agency proceedings, and increased accountability
of administrative agencies to the legislature and the public. It has
described these trends, and then explored their interaction. It
has proposed goal analysis as a method to integrate the three
trends. In so doing, it has discussed goals and standards, conflicts
among trends and goals, integrating principles, and methods of
structuring citizen and legislative involvement in the administra-
tive process. It is to be hoped that the ideas expressed herein will
stimulate thinking and writing by other scholars in the field on
these subjects.

